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Unifying Antitrust Enforcement for
the Digital Age
John O. McGinnis* & Linda Sun**
Abstract
As the digital revolution continues to transform competition
among businesses, U.S. antitrust enforcement has struggled to
remain effective. The U.S. has long depended on a system of dual
antitrust enforcement through both the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ).
Modern technology has greatly exacerbated existing structural
deficiencies of the two-headed approach, at times resulting in
deadlock. The two agencies approach new antitrust issues
generated by computational technologies differently and fight
over who should lead key investigations, leading to economic
uncertainty in the most important business sectors. These
enforcement disagreements can also hobble the government’s
response to significant national security issues emerging from
the interplay of technological competition among private
companies and among nation states. Further, dual enforcement
hinders government action in the newly critical area of data
privacy: the agency responsible, the FTC, suffers a mission
overload of enforcing both antitrust and privacy, which can work
against each other.
The best solution is for the DOJ to become the sole antitrust
enforcement agency. First, antitrust decisions, especially in the
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technology arena, directly affect geopolitical competition and
international relations, a province constitutionally assigned to
the president. It therefore makes more sense for the DOJ, which,
unlike the FTC, is controlled by the president, to direct antitrust
enforcement as one piece of a larger foreign policy. Second,
consolidating enforcement in the DOJ would also allow the FTC
to concentrate on enforcing privacy law, free from its
sometimes-conflicting antitrust mandate. Dual enforcement of
antitrust law should yield to single agency enforcement, with the
FTC enforcing privacy and the DOJ enforcing antitrust.
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INTRODUCTION
For over a century, the U.S. has maintained a system of
dual antitrust enforcement. Antitrust laws are executed by two
federal agencies: the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) through its Antitrust Division.1
Throughout their histories, the agencies have struggled to
navigate their overlapping jurisdiction, often butting heads and
creating redundancies.2 With the digital revolution, existing
cracks in the system have widened to the point of rendering the
current system irrelevant and ineffective. Dual enforcement is
a waste of government resources that duplicates efforts, fails to
provide the technology industry with reasonable certainty for
business and investment decisions, introduces barriers to a
cohesive foreign policy and defense strategy, and hinders the
development of privacy regulation and enforcement.
Accelerated technological change exacerbates three main
problems with the dual antitrust agency system. First, while
dual enforcement has always created uncertainty and thus
harmed business planning and economic growth, developments
in computer technology have made these problems more acute.3
In recent decades, the technology industry has experienced the
rise of a handful of dominant companies, such as Facebook,
Google, Amazon, and Apple, all central to the economic vitality

1. See William E. Kovacic, Downsizing Antitrust: Is It Time to End Dual
Federal Enforcement?, 41 ANTITRUST BULL. 505, 508 (1996) (explaining the
U.S. antitrust enforcement structure).
2. See, e.g., Norman Armstrong et al., Senators Urge DOJ to Develop
Antitrust Guidance for Licensing of Standard Essential Patents, JD SUPRA
(Oct. 25, 2019), https://perma.cc/Q8H4-9JPL (“The FTC and DOJ have adopted
opposing positions at times [with regard to antitrust enforcement], and there
have even been internal inconsistencies within the agencies.”).
3. See Ernest Gellhorn et al., Has Antitrust Outgrown Dual
Enforcement? A Proposal for Rationalization, 35 ANTITRUST BULL. 695, 714
(1990) (remarking that as markets have become more competitive “dual
enforcement is a luxury we can no longer afford”).
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of the nation.4 Contemporaneously, debate has erupted over
how antitrust law should be adapted to regulate these
companies, which have introduced new platforms, markets, and
products that were not anticipated by traditional tests.5
Advocates for cracking down on tech giants like Apple and
Google argue that the companies wield outsized market power
and harm competition.6 On the other side, critics of increased
competition regulation for the technology sector note that
technology advances so quickly that seemingly-entrenched
monopolists are in fact easily replaced by competition.7 At such
a pivotal moment, the FTC and DOJ have failed to work
together effectively. Instead, inter-agency fighting and a divided
framework have created uncertainty for the regulation of the
economically vital technology industry.8
Second, the growing power and ever widening scope of
computational technology has entangled antitrust policy with
international politics and national security.9 Electronic

4. See Kyle Daly, Big Tech’s Power, in 4 Numbers, AXIOS (July 27, 2020),
https://perma.cc/PE4G-A2EY (reporting that the combined annual revenue of
Facebook, Google, Amazon, and Apple was $773 billion in 2019).
5. See Scott Scher et al., United States: Digital Platforms, in GLOBAL
COMPETITION REVIEW INSIGHT: AMERICAS ANTITRUST REVIEW 2020 68, 68–74
(2019), https://perma.cc/3RBW-DMQ8 (PDF) (evaluating how the new digital
age impacts the DOJ’s and FTC’s fundamental analyses).
6. See Rachel Martin, Have Tech Companies Become Too Powerful?
Congress Will Investigate, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 4, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://
perma.cc/KU7Y-LA2X (“Some [members of] Congress think that [Facebook,
Google, Apple, and Amazon] have gotten way too big and have way too much
power to the point that they are snuffing out competition and actually harming
consumers.”).
7. See Catherine Tucker, Network Effects and Market Power: What Have
We Learned in the Last Decade?, 32 ANTITRUST 72, 73 (2018), https://perma.cc
/PP9T-SBUN (PDF) (“[N]etwork effects do not imply entrenchment and can
actually lead to quicker destabilization of a market leader position.”).
8. See Lauren Feiner, Here’s Why the Top Two Antitrust Enforcers in the
US Are Squabbling Over Who Gets to Regulate Big Tech, CNBC (Sept. 18,
2019, 10:31 AM), https://perma.cc/2SYZ-XW3N (noting the complaint among
some lawmakers that the DOJ and FTC are “wasting time fighting with each
other instead of digging into their investigations”).
9. See Jon Bateman, The Antitrust Threat to National Security, WALL
ST. J. (Oct. 22, 2019, 6:43 PM), https://perma.cc/GK4B-7E8Z (“Any responsible
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technology has increased the avenues of attack and transformed
traditional weapons of war.10 Innovations in hardware and
software have introduced novel methods of espionage and
cyberwarfare such as computational propaganda, trolling, and
sophisticated hacking.11 This technological acceleration has led
to an international battle for technological dominance that has
been dubbed a “technology cold war.”12 China and Russia in
particular have dedicated significant resources towards hostile
social manipulation or information/influence warfare.13 Ceding
control over communications technologies to foreign powers may
leave the U.S. vulnerable to surveillance and infrastructure
takedowns.14 Hacking groups have targeted U.S. defense
contractors and telecommunications companies.15 As both the
Obama and Trump administrations recognized,16 antitrust
antitrust debate must address the national security risks of breaking up Big
Tech—and the parallel risks of keeping these companies intact.”).
10. See Jon Harper, U.S., Allies Bolstering Electronic Warfare Systems,
NAT’L DEF. MAG. (Feb. 27, 2020), https://perma.cc/75JW-Y94B (“The U.S. is
expected to lead the way in electronic warfare spending [over the next several
years.]”).
11. MICHAEL J. MAZARR ET AL., HOSTILE SOCIAL MANIPULATION: PRESENT
REALITIES AND EMERGING TRENDS 22–23 (RAND Corp. ed., 2019), https://
perma.cc/SP6C-LBJJ (PDF).
12. Billy Perrigo, Britain Sides with China in Technology Cold War, TIME
(Jan. 30, 2020, 6:43 AM), https://perma.cc/Q67Y-7AZP.
13. See MAZARR ET AL., supra note 11, at xii (“Russia and China believe
themselves to be engaged in an information war with the West . . . and have
begun to invest significant resources in such tools.”).
14. See id. at xiii (“[D]espite the apparent limited effects to date, the
marriage of the hostile intent of several leading powers and the evolution of
several interrelated areas of information technology has the potential to vastly
increase the effectiveness and reach of these [technological social
manipulation] techniques over time.”).
15. See 9 Latest Cyber-Espionage Affairs, EC-COUNCIL BLOG (Mar. 7,
2019), https://perma.cc/D5T9-MMYD (“[A] group of Chinese-linked
hackers . . . targeted defense contractors and telecommunications companies
in the United States and Southeast Asia.”).
16. See Liz Gaines, President Obama Says Europe’s Aggressiveness
Toward Google Comes from Protecting Lesser Competitors, BENTON INST. FOR
BROADBAND & SOC’Y (Feb. 16, 2015), https://perma.cc/Y9XR-6SKY; Caoimhe
Toman, Trump Attacks EU Sanctions US Tech Companies, SHARECAST NEWS
(June 26, 2019, 5:18 PM), https://perma.cc/UZ7W-GBT8.
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enforcement can impede domestic technological advancement
by giving foreign companies—collaborating with foreign
governments—a competitive advantage. Because of the
increased importance of antitrust to national security,
enforcement should be left to the DOJ alone. Its leaders serve at
the pleasure of the president, whose office has greater
perspective and tools available in protecting the nation and
navigating international relationships.
Third, digital technology has amplified a central issue of
consumer protection—privacy. Technology has increased the
amount and the ease by which personal data is collected, stored,
and shared, leaving consumers in a vulnerable position. The
FTC currently oversees both domestic antitrust enforcement
and privacy, but has no more than fifty employees working on
privacy issues.17 Without a doubt, the agency requires more
people dedicated to privacy law and regulation.18 But more than
a higher headcount, the FTC needs to shed its antitrust
jurisdiction because the underlying purpose of competition law
can conflict with the development of privacy regulation.19
Antitrust law promotes the free market, while privacy laws
disturb the free market to protect consumers.20 Agencies operate
more efficiently when they can focus on a coherent mission free
of internal tension.21 Eliminating the FTC’s antitrust
responsibilities would enable the agency to give the consumer
17. See Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., The FTC Can Rise to the Privacy
Challenge, but Not Without Help from Congress, BROOKINGS INST. (Aug. 8,
2019), https://perma.cc/YA4Z-HS67 (describing the FTC’s workforce). In
comparison, the U.K.’s information commissioner’s office has over seven
hundred employees dedicated to privacy and data protection. Id.
18. See id. (“Resources are the FTC’s greatest constraint. It is a small
agency charged with a broad mission in competition and consumer
protection.”).
19. See Ernest Gellhorn, Two’s a Crowd: The FTC’s Redundant Antitrust
Powers, AM. ENTER. INST. (Dec. 7, 1981), https://perma.cc/L22B-W354 (“The
whole theory of consumer protection is very different from that which should
underlie antitrust enforcement. Properly defined, antitrust intervenes in the
market only to correct market failures by barring conduct that distorts market
forces or otherwise by restoring competitive opportunities.”).
20. See id.
21. See infra notes 371–379 and accompanying text.
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protection problems of data privacy and security the focus they
warrant.
A recent important case, Federal Trade Commission v.
Qualcomm, Inc.,22 showcases the contemporary confusion
created by retaining two antitrust enforcement agencies.23 The
FTC brought suit against Qualcomm for allegedly violating
antitrust law with its “no license, no chips” policy, which
required phone makers to license Qualcomm’s patents if they
wanted to purchase the company’s smartphone chips.24 In the
appeal before the Ninth Circuit,25 the Department of Justice
took the podium to argue directly against the FTC’s position on
standard-essential patents, an issue of great importance to
technological development. Additionally, the Department of
Justice argued that the suit, brought by one of the government’s
own agencies, posed a threat to national security because
Qualcomm’s competitive position as a domestic chipmaker was
important to maintain for the nation’s safety.26 The impact of
the case will be far-reaching, as evidenced by the multiple
amicus briefs filed by scholars, companies, and organizations in
fields from economics to patent law.27 With so much on the line,
22. 411 F. Supp. 3d 658 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
23. See generally id. See John D. McKinnon & Brent Kendall, U.S.
Antitrust Enforcers Signal Discord over Probes of Big Tech, WALL ST. J. (Sept.
16, 2019, 10:11 PM), https://perma.cc/R8AV-2NKL (referencing Senator Mike
Lee’s statement regarding the Qualcomm case that “[t]his kind of dysfunction
and confusion illustrates why having two agencies at loggerheads does not
make for effective antitrust enforcement”).
24. See Qualcomm, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 669, 703.
25. FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020).
26. See Brief for the United States of America (Dep’t of Justice) as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Appellant and Vacatur at 2, FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 969
F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-16122) (“[T]he court erred in imposing an
expansive compulsory licensing remedy . . . that . . . has the potential to
negatively impact innovation in 5G technologies and compromise national
security.”).
27. See, e.g., Brief for Antitrust and Patent Law Professors, Economists,
and Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant and Reversal, FTC v.
Qualcomm, Inc., 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-16122); Brief for Alliance
of U.S. Startups & Investors for Jobs (“USIJ”) as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellant Qualcomm Incorporated, FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 969 F.3d 974 (9th
Cir. 2020) (No. 19-16122); Brief for Dolby Laboratories, Inc. as Amici Curiae
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the agencies wasted government resources, created confusion
for corporations, and undermined a coherent foreign policy by
advocating against each other. Even the Ninth Circuit noted the
oddity of a divided opinion from the government.28
This paper proceeds in two parts. Part I explains how the
importance of technology to the economy together with the
difficulty of applying antitrust laws to new technology combine
to make the uncertainty generated by dual enforcement a
crippling problem. The dispute between the FTC and DOJ
regarding standard-essential patents (SEPs) exemplifies the
confusion.29 Even outside of the technology disputes, the dual
agency structure has not worked, creating costly inefficiencies
and turf disputes. The Part examines the problems that flow
from a duplicative structure—from wasted resources to
substantive delays.30 These concerns show that antitrust
enforcement must be consolidated under one agency.
The Part also responds to the view that dual enforcement
may have compensating advantages by bringing to bear
different views on complicated issues and letting the courts
decide which is better. Courts are unlikely to be good at choosing
between agency views in an area as complicated as antitrust.
Indeed, more than in other areas, courts rely on the
government’s published antitrust guidelines for their
framework of analysis.31 Moreover, antitrust cases take a very

Supporting Neither Party, FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir.
2020) (No. 19-16122).
28. FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 935 F.3d 752, 754 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Although
the hardship to the party opposing the stay and the public interest usually
merge when the government is the opposing party, this case is unique, as the
government itself is divided about the propriety of the judgment and its impact
on the public interest.” (internal citations omitted)). Ultimately, the Ninth
Circuit ruled in favor of Qualcomm on legal grounds. Id. at 757. But that
victory for the DOJ’s position was not based on foreign policy considerations,
and another panel could have come out for the FTC, as did the district court.
29. See infra Part I.A.3.
30. See infra Part I.
31. See infra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
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long time to resolve,32 and the uncertainty created by agency
disagreement can retard the most dynamic sector of the
economy. Finally, if this approach were sound, the government
would generally use dual agencies to enforce major laws, like
those applying to securities or the environment, but it does not
do so.
Part II discusses why antitrust enforcement should be
consolidated in the Department of Justice. First, advancing
technology has exacerbated the effects of antitrust policy on
national security and rising data privacy concerns.33 Therefore,
the DOJ should lead antitrust enforcement to enable the
executive branch to coordinate enforcement with foreign affairs.
Whatever one’s view of a particular president, the need for a
unitary voice in foreign affairs has long been established.34 And
there is no substitute for the national security apparatus and
the intelligence it brings that is under the president’s control.
Second, consolidation of antitrust within the DOJ would
enable the FTC to expand its efforts on protecting privacy, the
pressing consumer protection problem of the technological age.
Agencies do better when they have a focused mission without
internal tensions.35 Antitrust law promotes competition and yet
privacy law often attempts to guarantee a level of privacy
stronger than that which would be delivered by the market.36 As
32. See Daniel A. Crane, Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, 63
VAND. L. REV. 675, 692 (2010) (“[T]he average private antitrust lawsuit today
takes over six years to disposition . . . .”).
33. See Dakota Foster, Antitrust Investigations Have Deep Implications
for AI and National Security, BROOKINGS INST. (June 2, 2020), https://perma.cc
/VG6A-HVJ7 (“With defense officials arguing that U.S. military superiority
may hinge on artificial intelligence capabilities, antitrust action aimed at
America’s largest tech companies . . . could affect the United States’
technological edge.”).
34. The notion that the president alone is responsible for the nation’s
foreign policy decisions goes back to the early republic. The most famous
articulation at that time is John Marshall’s statement in the House of
Representatives: “The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external
relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.” 10 ANNALS OF
CONG. 613 (1800); see infra notes 256–261 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 314–316 and accompanying text.
36. See Mark MacCarthy, Privacy Is Not an Antitrust Issue, FORBES (Oct.
1, 2018, 4:39 PM), https://perma.cc/5WSS-SFCQ (“How can ensuring
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a result, most foreign nations have an agency devoted to privacy
law distinct from that devoted to antitrust law. The United
States should join that international consensus.
I.

CONSOLIDATING ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT

Antitrust enforcement should be consolidated under a
single agency. The failures of dual enforcement by the FTC and
DOJ can be placed in two buckets: inefficiencies and
inconsistencies. Dual enforcement causes duplication of effort
and uncoordinated workflow, but also divergent procedures and
uncertain outcomes.37 These problems are exemplified and
exacerbated in our age of technological acceleration.
Subpart A shows that regulation of the technology industry,
probably the most important area of our economy, is an
emerging area of bitter contention. Both the FTC and DOJ
regulate competition issues in technology, and the agencies
have struggled to divide investigations of the industry due to
the intertwined actors and complex issues.38 First, the subpart
describes the novel challenges brought on by electronic
technology. Since traditional antitrust tests are often an uneasy
fit for new markets and methods of competition introduced by
technology,39 divided enforcement exacerbates the uncertainty
in how antitrust law will be applied. Second, the subpart
examines agency turf wars over the industry: the agencies have

reasonable competitive conduct in markets advance consumer privacy
interests? It seems like a classic case of apples and oranges.”).
37. William Blumenthal, Models for Merging the U.S. Antitrust Agencies,
1 J. ANTITRUST ENF’T 24, 29–30 (2013).
38. See McKinnon & Kendall, supra note 23 (citing tech issues as a “major
contributing factor” to the strained relationship between the FTC and the
DOJ).
39. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Eisenach & Ilene Knable Gotts, In Search of a
Competition Doctrine for Information Technology Markets: Recent Antitrust
Developments in the Online Sector, in COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPETITION LAW
KEY ISSUES IN THE TELECOMS, MEDIA & TECHNOLOGY SECTORS 69 (Fabrizio
Cugia di Sant’Orsola et al. eds., 2015) (discussing cases that illustrate the
challenges of enforcing competition law in information technology markets).
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struggled to coordinate investigation of tech companies40 to the
detriment of the companies, consumers, and innovation as a
whole.
Finally, the subpart offers a case study of how technological
developments have led to intractable disagreement between the
agencies by way of examining standard-essential patents.
Standard-Essential Patents (SEPs) provide the foundation for
future technological progress, but the DOJ and FTC disagree on
whether licensing of SEPs should be forced to promote
competition. Without resolution, this divide leaves key U.S.
companies in the dark as to how to structure deals, hindering
technological advancement.
Subpart B recalls that the problems created by dual
enforcement, while more acute than ever, are not new and are
not the result of a carefully deliberated choice by Congress.41
Eliminating dual enforcement would not only rationalize
antitrust enforcement at home, but also bring the United States
into conformity with technology agencies around the world.
A.

Antitrust Regulation of Technology

Antitrust regulation of technology is vital to the economy.42
It has the power to change the future of the tech industry, and
those changes in turn have domino effects on sectors from
healthcare and manufacturing to transportation and energy.43
40. See John D. McKinnon & James V. Grimaldi, Justice Department,
FTC Skirmish Over Antitrust Turf, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 5, 2019, 5:45 PM),
https://perma.cc/R8AV-2NKL.
41. See Marc Winerman, The Origins of the FTC: Concentration,
Cooperation, Control, and Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 4 (2003)
(describing the origins of the FTC Act passed by Congress in 1914, which
created the FTC and empowered it to prosecute “unfair methods of
competition”).
42. See, e.g., Makada Henry-Nickie et al., Trends in the Information
Technology Sector, BROOKINGS INST. (Mar. 29, 2019), https://perma.cc/8YMZFA6T (“Digital technologies have risen to prominence as a critical determinant
of economic growth, national security, and international competitiveness.”).
43. See 5G & the Future of Connectivity: 20 Industries the Tech Could
Transform, CBINSIGHTS (Mar. 19, 2019), https://perma.cc/W4DR-KQL2
(describing numerous industries that are predicted to be disrupted by 5G
technology); M. Ishaq Nadiri et al., Impact of Modern Communication
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While the application of antitrust law to the technology sector is
a hot topic among scholars, regulators, and politicians, the path
forward is complex.44 It is unclear how competition law will be
applied to emerging technology, because traditional antitrust
tests must be adapted to new markets, products, and methods
of competition introduced by the digital revolution.45

Infrastructure on Productivity, Production Structure and Factor Demands of
U.S. Industries: Impact Revisited, 42 TELECOMM. POL’Y 433, 439–40 (2018)
(concluding that communication technology has increased productivity in all
industries, with health and construction in the top five industries).
44. See, e.g., Kaushik Basu, New Technology and Increasing Returns: The
End of the Antitrust Century? 12–16 (IZA—Inst. of Lab. Econs., Working
Paper, IZA Policy Paper No. 146, 2019), https://perma.cc/E4H5-M68D (PDF)
(calling for new antitrust laws to address digital technology); TIM WU, THE
CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (2018) (arguing that
antitrust regulation should be reinvigorated to address Big Tech); Thibault
Schrepel, Is Blockchain the Death of Antitrust Law? The Blockchain Antitrust
Paradox, 3 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 281, 281–85 (2019) (discussing how regulators
should tackle issues introduced by blockchain technology); Margaret Harding
McGill, Tech’s Long Hot Summer of Antitrust, AXIOS (May 26, 2020), https://
perma.cc/35P8-YUBS (highlighting action by the DOJ, House Judiciary, state
attorneys general, and FTC against tech giants); John D. McKinnon & Deepa
Seetharaman, FTC Expands Antitrust Investigation into Big Tech, WALL ST.
J. (Feb. 11, 2020, 5:18 PM), https://perma.cc/UP7C-43AB; Barbara Ortutay,
Big Tech Is Now a Big Punching Bag for Politicians, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct.
11, 2019), https://perma.cc/H5HB-2EUQ (noting bipartisan criticism of Big
Tech); Elizabeth Warren, Here’s How We Can Break Up Big Tech, MEDIUM
(Mar. 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/QH3K-M7XZ (stating the then-presidential
candidate’s platform in regards to antitrust action against Big Tech).
45. See Cristina Caffarra & Oliver Latham, Is Antitrust in Need of
Disruption: What Is Disruptive Innovation and What, If Anything, Does
Competition Policy Need to Do to React to It?, 2 ITALIAN ANTITRUST REV. 86,
88–93 (2018), https://perma.cc/83ZC-Y2NS (PDF) (discussing how “existing
antitrust theories of harm might need to be adapted in a context of disruptive
innovation”); WILSON C. FREEMAN & JAY B. SYKES, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
ANTITRUST AND “BIG TECH” 33–35 (2019), https://perma.cc/WDB7-CUTC (PDF)
(stating that some commentators have proposed changes to antitrust law to
promote competition in technology markets while others have advocated for
competition regulation rules tailored specifically to the technology sector);
Karry Lai, Antitrust Regulators Struggle with Big Data, INT’L FIN. L. REV.
(June 11, 2019), https://perma.cc/335U-DMF5 (“In an age of big tech where the
likes of Google, Facebook and Amazon have monopolized markets, unbound by
traditional antitrust laws, regulators around the world are playing catch
up . . . .”).
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Thus, dual enforcement has greater risks than ever before,
both because disagreement is more likely and costs of
uncertainty are greater. This subpart outlines this potential for
uncertainty in a variety of areas of antitrust doctrine. In fact,
the risk is not just potential. The DOJ and FTC already disagree
on the important issue of how to regulate SEPs, creating
uncertainty in a growing industry worth billions of dollars.46
The agencies are additionally fighting over who should take the
lead in regulating high tech, resulting in divergent
investigations when antitrust analysis requires consideration of
the entire competitive market to reach sound conclusions.47
1.

The Need for Certainty in Antitrust Regulation of
Technology

A unified approach to antitrust regulation is especially
important when it comes to the technology industry for three
reasons. First, the rapidly growing technology industry is at the
center of the U.S. economy: in 2018, the internet sector
accounted for $2.1 trillion of the economy and 10 percent of the
GDP.48 Uncertainty about antitrust rules created by dual
enforcement hinders economic growth.
Second, technological industries are especially sensitive to
shifts in antitrust policy because antitrust actions can change
the trajectory of fast-changing industries. For instance, the
DOJ’s antitrust enforcement action against the Bell System
broke up the monopoly in telephony.49 One court later
summarized the effect as “an unprecedented flowering of
innovation” in the telecom industry.50 Agency antitrust action
also played a large role in the growth of software, browser, and

46. See infra Part I.A.3.
47. See infra Part I.A.3.
48. David Shepardson, Internet Sector Contributes $2.1 Trillion to U.S.
Economy: Industry Group, REUTERS (Sept. 26, 2019, 3:58 PM), https://perma.cc
/4D84-MBKC.
49. See Bret Swanson, Lessons from the AT&T Break Up, 30 Years Later,
AEIDEAS (Jan. 3, 2014), https://perma.cc/XFT8-45EB.
50. United States v. W. Elec. Co., 809 F. Supp. 1, 9 (D.D.C. 1995).
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web company competition.51 In anticipation of a Justice
Department antitrust suit,52 IBM unbundled its software and
hardware products in the 1960s,53 dramatically changing the
software market. Nearly overnight, software went from a
typically free good to a commercial product.54 Governmental
antitrust enforcement is additionally credited for Microsoft’s
1997 investment in its rival company Apple, which saved the
then-nascent company from the brink of bankruptcy.55 Microsoft
likely acted in self-preservation because it faced antitrust
scrutiny that came to a head in a DOJ suit the year after.56 The
51. See, e.g., Adi Robertson, How the Antitrust Battles of the ‘90s Set the
Stage for Today’s Tech Giants, VERGE (Sep. 6, 2018, 11:57 AM), https://
perma.cc/L2AU-GT8X (“[T]he Microsoft settlement is credited with giving web
companies like Google—and browsers like Google Chrome, which overtook
Internet Explorer in 2012—space to grow.”).
52. See generally United States v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 475 F. Supp.
1372 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
53. IBM announced its unbundling prior to the antitrust suit, as what
many believe was a preemptive action. See Martin Campbell-Kelly & Daniel
D. Garcia-Swartz, Pragmatism, Not Ideology: Historical Perspectives on IBM’s
Adoption of Open-Source Software, 21 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 229, 236 (2009);
Burton Grad, A Personal Recollection: IBM’s Unbundling of Software and
Services, 24 IEEE ANNALS HIST. COMPUTING 64, 65 (2002) (“IBM
executives . . . held discussions with senior DOJ attorneys and believed that
IBM could preempt a DOJ suit by announcing it would unbundle its services,
then doing so promptly.”); cf. James Pethokoukis, Taking a Second Look at the
Idea That Antitrust Action Created the U.S. Software Industry, AEIDEAS (Jan.
12, 2018), https://perma.cc/WNH8-KUTG (proposing an alternate take that
perhaps market forces were the primary reason for the decision to unbundle
rather than government action); see also John E. Lopatka, United States v.
IBM: A Monument to Arrogance, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 145, 146–48 (2000)
(arguing that the suit against IBM was a poor decision).
54. See Martin Campbell-Kelly, Development and Structure of the
International Software Industry, 1950–1990, 24 BUS. & ECON. HIST. 73, 88
(1995); Software Becomes a Product, COMPUT. HIST. MUSEUM, https://perma.cc
/Y4E6-RSU8.
55. Catherine Clifford, When Microsoft Saved Apple: Steve Jobs and Bill
Gates Show Eliminating Competition Isn’t the Only Way to Win, CNBC (June
12, 2020, 11:48 AM), https://perma.cc/V759-7XTH.
56. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
The suit began in 1998. See Carlson Martin, Did Bill Gates Save Apple from
Bankruptcy or Microsoft from the Law?, MONEYCONTROL (Jan. 31, 2019, 1:25
PM), https://perma.cc/7RNC-788Y (“Bill Gates didn’t want his company
broken up by a long-drawn-out court battle. So what better way to show
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Microsoft settlement itself is “credited with giving web
companies
like
Google—and
browsers
like
Google
Chrome . . . space to grow.”57 These actions changed the
technological landscape, and future antitrust decisions
regarding technology companies will have just as significant of
an impact, if not more.
Moreover, antitrust policy is very important to the
research and development that is the heart of innovation in
tech, particularly as more research and development has moved
from the public sector to the private sector.58 Private companies
are affected more directly by antitrust policies.59 Even the
financing of technology is dependent on antitrust law. Today, as
discussed in more detail below,60 the primary reason a tech
start-up receives funding from investors is its acquisition
potential; merger and acquisition policies play a significant
role.61 Once again, certainty here is important for investors, and

Microsoft isn’t a monopoly than by supporting the competition.”); John C.
Abell, Aug. 6, 1997: Apple Rescued—by Microsoft, WIRED (Aug. 6, 2009, 12:00
AM), https://perma.cc/9QW3-AWFD (“Timing mattered: [Microsoft] was in the
midst of an image-tarnishing antitrust fight over its heavy-handed promotion
of IE during the height of the browser wars with Netscape.”).
57. Robertson, supra note 51.
58. David M. Hart, Antitrust and Technology Innovation, 15 ISSUES SCI.
& TECH. 75, 75 (1999) (“As the funding and performance of scientific and
technological activity increasingly shift into the private sector in the coming
decades, the relative importance of antitrust policy will continue to grow.”).
59. See id.
In some sectors, antitrust policy has been far more consequential
for research and innovation than the federal R&D spending policies
that have attracted far more attention from analysts and
policymakers. As the funding and performance of scientific and
technological activity increasingly shift into the private sector in
the coming decades, the relative importance of antitrust policy will
continue to grow.
60. See infra notes 75–77 and accompanying text.
61. Ernesto Falcon, Senate Antitrust Hearing Explores Big Tech’s Merger
Mania, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 30, 2019), https://perma.cc/97BPGWLQ (“[A] hard look and update of mergers and acquisitions policy is one of
many actions needed to preserve the life cycle of competition that has been a
hallmark of the Internet.”).
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possible and actual conflicts between DOJ and the FTC reduce
certainty.
Third, a unified approach to antitrust has become more
important because the antitrust issues affecting tech are
particularly complex; it is difficult to determine how best to
apply antitrust law to emerging technologies.62 This challenge
makes it more likely that DOJ and the FTC will proceed on
different theories, increasing uncertainty. For instance,
antitrust scholars and regulators have struggled to apply the
traditional small but significant non-transitory increase in
prices (SSNIP) test to zero-price tech markets.63 The SSNIP
test, used by both the FTC and DOJ, defines a relevant antitrust
market as the “smallest grouping of products for which a
hypothetical monopolist could profitably impose a 5% price
increase.”64 However, many technology platforms offer their
products at no monetary cost to customers. The lack of
measurable price renders the SSNIP test difficult to
operationalize.65 This complexity makes it more likely that the
DOJ and the FTC will apply the test differently, resulting in
uneven and unfair outcomes. SSNIP is only one of many areas
of debate regarding how antitrust is to be applied to technology.
Technology has raised questions regarding whether
increased prices or decreased output is still a viable measure of
monopoly. As an example, Facebook has not raised prices or
restricted output since its founding, despite plausible claims
that it dominates social media.66 While dominant platform

62. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
63. See John M. Newman, Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Applications,
94 WASH. U. L. REV. 49, 49 (2016) (“[D]espite the critical role that [zero-price]
markets now play in modern economies, the antitrust enterprise has largely
failed to account for their unique attributes.”).
64. FREEMAN & SYKES, supra note 45, at 5–6.
65. See id. at 6 (“The difficulty with applying the SSNIP test to such
markets is clear . . . there is no sound way to analyze a 5% increase in a price
of zero because such an increase would result in a price that remains zero.”
(internal quotations omitted)).
66. See Tyler Cowen, Breaking Up Facebook Would Be a Big Mistake,
SLATE (June 13, 2019, 7:30 AM), https://perma.cc/LW3W-2LGN (“It is
commonly alleged that Facebook has a monopoly on social networking, yet
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companies like Amazon have been accused of levying monopoly
power,67 others claim that platform giants and their house
brands actually keep prices low.68
Even defining the market of technology companies raises
novel conundrums. To illustrate, Google has a very large share
in the market for horizontal search (searches across the
internet), but not in general search: users often turn to
specialized websites, such as eBay or Amazon, for product
searches.69 Even if horizontal search is the defining market,
Google’s large share does not necessarily beget monopoly power.
Consumers can easily switch between search engines and spend
most of their time on websites, which compete with search
engines for advertising revenue.70 Addressing these complex
unlike traditional villainous monopolists, Facebook has not raised prices—the
service is free—or restricted output.”).
67. Dana Mattioli, Amazon Scooped Up Data from Its Own Sellers to
Launch Competing Products, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 23, 2020, 9:51 PM),
https://perma.cc/B5VV-U8C6 (“Amazon.com Inc. employees have used data
about independent sellers on the company’s platform to develop competing
products, a practice at odds with the company’s stated policies.”); Kim
Hyun-bin, Naver Under Fire for Unfair Marketing Practices, KOREA TIMES
(May 27, 2020, 7:12 PM), https://perma.cc/M3MD-9K5Z (“Naver, the country’s
leading internet portal, is once again drawing negative attention for trying to
sneak in advertisements to enhance benefits for its paid members, which
many critics claim is an abuse of its dominant market power.”).
68. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Warren Campaign’s Antitrust
Proposals, REGUL. REV. (Mar. 25, 2019), https://perma.cc/SX4B-5PWP (“House
brands such as AmazonBasics allow customers to avoid paying high prices for
the trademarks of other large companies. And when house brands are sold in
competition with branded goods, as they are on Amazon, they also force name
brands to cut their own prices.”).
69. See Marina Lao, Search, Essential Facilities, and the Antitrust Duty
to Deal, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 275, 293 (2013) (“Users who are
interested in a specific category of content can, and often do, turn to specialized
websites for information, bypassing general search engines. Studies show that
search on these specialized sites, which include Amazon, eBay, and Facebook,
now accounts for over one-third of all web searches.”).
70. See Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Google and the Limits of
Antitrust: The Case against the Case against Google, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 171, 195 (2011) (“‘Over 60% of search engine visitors use at least two
different search engines,’ meaning, as Google so often asserts, that
competition really is ‘just a click away’ for a significant number of users.”
(internal citations omitted)).
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issues requires careful coordination between the DOJ and FTC,
which based on the agencies’ histories, is difficult at best and
unachievable at worst.
Mergers between platforms and nascent technologies also
raise new questions.71 On the one hand, some worry that such
mergers and acquisitions will entrench the monopoly power of
the platform.72 Preventing such mergers could enable nascent
technologies to develop into strong competitors, diversifying the
landscape and increasing consumer choice. For instance, some
believe that Instagram, acquired by Facebook, might have
become a strong competitor in social media.73 Many
quintessential U.S. tech companies, such as Intel, Apple,
Google, and Netflix, had their beginnings as small start-ups.74
On the other hand, the possibility of profitable acquisitions
may be increasing innovation by incentivizing a greater number
of start-ups. To reach a large market and grow quickly,
start-ups typically require funding from external investors.75
71. See Competition in Digital Technology Markets: Examining
Acquisitions of Nascent or Potential Competitors by Digital Platforms: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Pol’y, and Consumer Rts. of
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 7 (2019) (statement of Professor
John M. Yun, Director, Economic Education at the Global Antitrust Institute)
(“Clearly, the acquisition of a potential or nascent competitor can result in an
outcome that is harmful to consumers and innovation, yet it can also result in
an outcome that unlocks a great deal of consumer value.”).
72. See, e.g., Megan Browdie et al., United States: Technology Mergers,
GLOB. COMPETITION REV. (Sept. 20, 2019), https://perma.cc/6ZN7-6QWJ
(expressing concern about acquisitions of nascent competitors in platform
industries because “these markets are prone to tipping, and with tipping
comes the potential for durable market power and substantial barriers to
entry”).
73. See, e.g., Makena Kelly, Facebook’s Messaging Merger Leaves
Lawmakers Questioning the Company’s Power, VERGE (Jan. 28, 2019, 12:47
PM), https://perma.cc/7CGB-CMSM (“If Facebook were to come under real
scrutiny by antitrust regulators, Instagram and WhatsApp would likely be
their first two targets.”).
74. Richard Florida, America Is Losing Its Edge for Startups, BLOOMBERG
CITYLAB (Oct. 9, 2018, 12:55 PM), https://perma.cc/7KZU-39ZF.
75. See Should You Pursue Funding for Your Startup?, STARTUP
DECISIONS, https://perma.cc/D3WB-PBZV (“External funding is most often
used by high growth startups . . . that will scale rapidly or that need to acquire
equipment, personnel, intellectual property or other assets quickly. High
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Start-ups are inherently risky endeavors, and the prospect of
acquisition drives investment.76 Today, start-up funding largely
hinges on the acquisition potential of the start-up: that is, how
likely it is that the start-up will be acquired by a Big Tech
incumbent and result in a payday for investors.77 Antitrust
regulation of mergers and acquisitions thus determines
investment behavior that is central to the tech economy: the
current dual system, with its inefficiencies and uncertainties,
does not suffice.
Large technology platform companies engage heavily in
R&D and promote consumer choice.78 Preventing their growth
via acquisitions could decrease those benefits.79 Some argue that
acquisitions actually allow companies to offer more options on
the marketplace.80 As an example, they note that Facebook is
able to provide an ad-free service in its acquired texting service
WhatsApp due to ad revenue that Facebook receives from its
other offerings.81 Otherwise, consumers might not have an
ad-free choice.
Even the basic antitrust concern about monopoly has been
seen by some as not well taken. Critics of breaking up Big Tech
growth startups . . . use this funding to establish themselves before
competitors enter the market.”).
76. See MAURITS DOLMANS & TOBIAS PESCH, CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN &
HAMILTON LLP, SHOULD WE DISRUPT ANTITRUST LAW? 8, https://perma.cc
/7FTK-U8RD (PDF) (“It could be counterproductive to make buying startups
prohibitively difficult. The prospect of being bought out is an important
incentive for startups. The potential for acquisition drives venture capital
firms to invest. This is the fuel that fires startups.”).
77. See Falcon, supra note 61 (“[H]ow attractive your company is to a big
tech acquisition is now arguably the primary reason a startup gets funded.”).
78. See DOLMANS & PESCH, supra note 76, at 5 (“[L]arge platforms engage
heavily in R&D and release new features constantly.”).
79. See id. (“If we [threaten to] break them up, we reduce incentives to
keep innovating.”).
80. See, e.g., Cowen, supra note 66 (noting that Google and Facebook
“allow small and midsize businesses to engage in targeted advertising, and
therefore to offer niche products that compete against the goods and services
of larger companies”).
81. See id. (“An independent WhatsApp, once placed under the pressure
to bring in more revenue and make profits as a solo enterprise, would acquire
more of the features Facebook critics find objectionable.”).
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argue that the rapid pace of change in high tech makes antitrust
enforcement counterproductive.82 While a company may own a
monopoly in one technology, that technology may be quickly
overturned. Soon after the government poured resources into
the DOJ’s 2011 suit against Microsoft, revolutions in computing
rendered the browser technology at the center of the case
irrelevant.83 As noted below,84 given that technology companies
are often potential competitors with one another, it would be
intolerable to force them to live under different legal regimes.
But given the difficulties of the issues involved and dual
enforcement, that prospect is entirely possible.
To be sure, some might argue that two enforcement
agencies provide advantages, precisely because the issues
raised by technology are hard. When agencies disagree, courts
can ultimately settle on the views that best comport with the
law. But any such claim faces powerful counterarguments.
First, antitrust is a very technical area.85 Courts rely on the
framework set by the antitrust administrative agencies more
than in other areas of law, as evidenced by the dominance of the
DOJ-FTC antitrust guidelines in judicial decisions.86 We cannot
be confident that the generalist judiciary can choose correctly
between expert agencies.
Second, it would take a long time for the circuit courts and
the Supreme Court to resolve fundamental conflicts between the
agencies. Antitrust cases often take an enormously long to time
conclude: they are the Jarndyce v. Jarndyce of modern civil
82. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Can Antitrust Keep Up?: Competition
Policy in High-Tech Markets, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 1, 2001), https://perma.cc
/M89E-5BAR.
83. See generally United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir.
2001). See also Sharon Pian Chan, Long Antitrust Saga Ends for Microsoft,
SEATTLE TIMES (May 12, 2011, 7:53 AM), https://perma.cc/EFT3-7K2F
(“Pervasive broadband has made it irrelevant whether PCs are sold with
preinstalled copies of Microsoft’s Internet Explorer. Now, anyone can
download competing browsers . . . in a few minutes, for free.”).
84. See infra notes 92–96 and accompanying text.
85. See infra note 240 and accompanying text.
86. See John O. McGinnis & Andrew M. Merkins, Dworkinian Antitrust,
102 IOWA L. REV. 1, 42 n.216 (2016) (showing that more than 250 federal cases
had relied on the antitrust merger guidelines).
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litigation.87 In contrast, technology moves fast. By the time the
application of the antitrust law is resolved as it affects currents
technologies, they may well have moved on to be different in
kind.88 During the interim, uncertainty will reign, discouraging
economic investment.
It might also be argued that companies will still face
uncertainty with a single agency because antitrust enforcement
policy can change from administration to administration. But,
first, this uncertainty is circumscribed, occurring only at the
change of administrations and is not the kind of continuous
uncertainty caused by the potential and actual disagreement
between the FTC and DOJ. Second, if antitrust enforcement
authority is lodged in the DOJ, as we recommend, the loss in
certainty comes with a gain in political accountability, as the
elected president becomes responsible for the content of
antitrust policy. No such gain occurs from disagreement
between the DOJ and FTC. To the contrary, dual enforcement
makes it unclear where political accountability lies.89
Both these arguments for dual enforcement also sit
uneasily with the structure of the rest of the administrative
state. As we discuss below,90 one agency is generally charged
with enforcing a single set of laws.91 The dual enforcement
87. See, e.g., GREGORY J. WERDEN & LUKE M. FROEB, ANTITRUST AND TECH:
EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES DIFFER, AND IT MATTERS 1, 5 (2019)
https://perma.cc/8Y96-3AEZ (PDF) (“Lengthy court proceedings nearly always
preceded imposition of a contested remedy in the United States.”).
88. See Daniel Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, Antitrust Approaches to
Dynamically Competitive Industries in the United States and the European
Union, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 695, 713 (2011).
89. See GANESH SITARAMAN, GREAT DEMOCRACY INITIATIVE, TAKING
ANTITRUST AWAY FROM THE COURTS: A STRUCTURAL APPROACH TO REVERSING
THE SECOND AGE OF MONOPOLY POWER 7 (2018), https://perma.cc/544N-XCWA
(PDF) (discussing the importance of political accountability in the field of
antitrust enforcement).
90. See infra Part I.B.3.
91. The general presumption in favor of making one agency responsible
for a regulatory area refutes any notion that the way to respond to fear of
agency capture is to create multiple agencies. In any event, both the Antitrust
Division and FTC are less likely to be captured than many agencies that singly
enforce their laws. They are “relatively well insulated from such influence by
the need to apply objective economic principles.” Joshua D. Wright et al.,
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structure for antitrust is anomalous and its anomality has more
costs than before, because of the need for certainty in our
dominant technology sector.
Regardless of the final policy decisions, addressing
competition in the technology industry requires a well-planned,
efficient, and cohesive approach, which can be achieved only
under a unified antitrust enforcement agency. Creating
uncertainty in the area has dire consequences for future
research and development and the economy. Given their current
performance, there can be little confidence that the FTC and
DOJ can work together in a coordinated manner to regulate
competition in the vital area of technology.
2.

Technological Turf Wars

Division between the FTC and the DOJ regarding the
technology industry is not merely a theoretical possibility.
Under dual enforcement, antitrust regulation of technology has
been plagued by bureaucratic turf wars.92 Not surprisingly, both
agencies want to take charge of the most important area in
antitrust and are unwilling to yield control to the other. Their
deadlock has resulted in a piecemeal investigation of the
technology industry. In late 2020, the DOJ filed an antitrust
suit against Google.93 Soon after, the FTC filed an antitrust suit
against Facebook.94 The DOJ is currently investigating Apple

Requiem for a Paradox: The Dubious Rise and Inevitable Fall of Hipster
Antitrust, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 293, 365 (2019). Moreover, unlike many other
agencies, important businesses both are sued and seek to sue at different
times under the antitrust law, making it harder for businesses to form a
unified front of influence.
92. See Emily Birnbaum, Antitrust Enforcers in Turf War over Big Tech,
HILL (Sept. 17, 2019, 5:35 PM), https://perma.cc/AT88-YTPM (“The two federal
agencies charged with investigating Big Tech are jockeying over how to divide
up their responsibilities, setting up a messy showdown that could undermine
the government’s efforts to take on the Silicon Valley giants.”).
93. Complaint, U.S. Dept. of Just. v. Google LLC, No. 20-cv-03010 (D.D.C.
Oct. 10 2020), ECF No. 1.
94. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Sues Facebook for Illegal
Monopolization, (Dec. 9, 2020), https://perma.cc/4HCX-8UXG.
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while the FTC investigates Amazon.95 This divided approach to
antitrust regulation is illogical. Google, Apple, Facebook, and
Amazon are competitors that rightfully should be considered
under a coordinated investigation.
The bifurcated investigation of Google, Apple, Facebook,
and Amazon (the “Big Four”)96 is especially significant because
the companies are part of what is referred to as “Big Tech.”97 Big
Tech refers to large, dominant technology companies that are
known for their influence, market power, and aggressive
acquisition strategies.98 With a combined market capitalization
of over $4 trillion,99 the “Big Five” (Google, Apple, Facebook,
Amazon, and Microsoft) have spent billions each year on
acquisitions, often acquiring nascent companies.100 In 2014,
they spent a record $46 billion on 138 total acquisition deals.101
Big Tech’s rise has not gone unnoticed. After the 2016
presidential election, many questioned whether large tech
platforms wield too much influence.102 In the years following,
Big Tech has come under fire from lawmakers on both sides of

95. See McKinnon & Kendall, supra note 23 (“Both the FTC and DOJ are
under considerable pressure to investigate and potentially challenge a range
of actions by a handful of companies.”).
96. See Big Five, PCMAG, https://perma.cc/ML7R-S6UW (“The Big Four
are Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon (GAFA).”).
97. See Big Tech, PCMAG, https://perma.cc/2BZ2-J2A9 (“Big Tech refers
to the major technology companies such as Apple, Google, Amazon and
Facebook, which have inordinate influence.”).
98. See Katie Jones, The Big Five: Largest Acquisitions by Tech Company,
VISUAL CAPITALIST (Oct. 11, 2019), https://perma.cc/4J3Q-VMRV (“Given their
financial weight, mergers and acquisitions have become a key tactic in
maintaining their strong grip on tech supremacy.”).
99. See id.
100. See Kate Rooney, New Government Pressure Could Mean the End of
Tech Mega Deals, CNBC (June 6, 2019, 1:34 PM), https://perma.cc/LP72-9SSB
(noting that “Microsoft, Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Alphabet and their
subsidiaries spent roughly $30 billion total on mergers and acquisitions” last
year).
101. See id.
102. See Birnbaum, supra note 92 (“The issues came to a head in 2016,
when it was revealed that foreign actors were able to manipulate the top social
media platforms in the U.S. to sow discord during the presidential elections.”).
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the political spectrum.103 In 2019, the House Judiciary
Subcommittee on Antitrust opened a bipartisan “top-to-bottom”
investigation of the tech industry, calling on tech executives to
address allegations of anti-competitive behavior.104 In the same
year, fifty attorneys general from U.S. states and territories
opened an antitrust investigation of Google.105 Another coalition
of state attorneys general announced a similar probe into
Facebook.106
The federal antitrust agencies attempted to mobilize to
address the same kind of questions. However, they had to first
agree on which agency would lead the investigation.107 Both
103. See id. (“The Washington ‘techlash’ has grabbed headlines over the
past two years as lawmakers, government regulators and the public have
questioned the dominance of Big Tech.”).
104. See Seth Fiegerman & Brian Fung, Democrats and Republicans Find
Unity in Trashing Big Tech, CNN (July 16, 2019, 6:45 PM), https://perma.cc
/YZ2V-UDT6; see also Marcy Gordon & Barbara Ortutay, Justice Dept. Opens
Sweeping Antitrust Investigation of Major U.S. Tech Companies,
RealClearPolitics (July 24, 2019), https://perma.cc/Q5XC-8NTL (noting
industry tech giants were accused of “creating a ‘startup kill zone’ to insulate
them from competition”). In February 2021, the House Judiciary Antitrust
Subcommittee opened another series of hearings on Big Tech, this time
regarding proposals to curb the dominance of online platforms and modernize
antitrust law. Press Release, House Committee on the Judiciary, House
Judiciary Antitrust Subcommittee Announces Series of Hearings on Proposals
to Curb the Dominance of Online Platforms and Modernize Antitrust Law
(Feb. 18, 2021), https://perma.cc/67YR-JERV; see Ashley Gold, House Begins
Brewing New Tech Antitrust Laws, AXIOS (Feb. 25, 2021),
https://perma.cc/E4DK-JLKF. Earlier that month, Amy Klobuchar, the
incoming chairwoman of the Senate’s panel on antitrust law and competition,
introduced a sweeping antitrust reform bill aimed at thwarting
anticompetitive mergers. David McLaughlin & Ben Brody, Democrats Pitch
Antitrust Revamp for ‘Too Big to Fix’ Deals, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 4, 2021),
https://perma.cc/2H72-FMSF.
105. See Makena Kelly, Google under Antitrust Investigation by 50
Attorneys General, VERGE (Sept. 9, 2019, 2:59 PM), https://perma.cc/DCD799SU (“The probe, led by Republican Attorney General Ken Paxton from
Texas, will focus primarily on Google’s advertising and search businesses. But
in remarks given Monday, the attorneys general suggested that they may
expand the investigation later.”).
106. See id.
107. See Birnbaum, supra note 92. According to former FTC Commissioner
William Kovacic, “The federal agencies often vie to pursue the flashiest
antitrust investigations of the day.” Id.
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wanted to take the helm, which resulted in a public battle.108 In
early 2019, the agencies negotiated a clearance arrangement
that split up Big Tech: the DOJ would investigate Google and
Apple while the FTC would handle Facebook and Amazon.109
This arrangement placed not only potential but actual
competitors under separate jurisdictions. For instance, Google
and Facebook compete in internet advertising.110 To that point,
a recent multistate antitrust suit alleges that Google and
Facebook colluded to set prices for online advertisements.111
Amazon and Apple compete in the market for smart devices.112
The Big Four compete with each other in multiple markets
including the Internet of Things,113 music streaming,114

108. See Baker & Hosteler LLP, Antitrust Agency Turf War Over Big Tech
Investigations, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 9, 2019), https://perma.cc/DF49-5BLS.
109. See McKinnon & Kendall, supra note 23.
110. See Amanda Lotz, ‘Big Tech’ Isn’t One Big Monopoly—It’s 5
Companies All in Different Businesses, CONVERSATION (Mar. 23, 2018, 2:56
PM), https://perma.cc/7HJ5-LQN5 (indicating that Google and Facebook
dominate in internet advertising, collecting 63 percent of U.S. digital
advertising revenue in 2017). Amazon and Facebook also compete in online
advertising. See Taylor Soper, Amazon’s Big New Business: Here’s How Much
Advertising Revenue the Company Generated in 2018, GEEKWIRE (Jan. 31,
2019, 2:14 PM), https://perma.cc/ZV22-NYE2 (discussing how advertising
drives a majority of revenue for Google and Facebook); see also Omar Oakes,
Apple Signals Greater Role for Ad Revenue as iPhone Sales Drop 15%,
CAMPAIGN US (Jan. 30, 2019), https://perma.cc/Y7MX-25WY (“Mentioning
advertising in a dialogue with investors is significant for Apple, which has
prided itself in selling hardware rather than relying on ads like Google and
Facebook.”).
111. See Complaint at 5–6, State of Texas v. Google LLC, No. 40-cv-957
(E.D. Tex. Dec. 16, 2020), ECF No. 1 (discussing the alleged agreement
between Google and Facebook); Ryan Tracy & Jeff Horwitz, Inside the
Google-Facebook Ad Deal at the Heart of a Price-Fixing Lawsuit, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 29, 2020), https://perma.cc/7Y7J-XMV3 (“Google gave Facebook special
terms and access to its ad server.”).
112. See Cliff Saran, Apple Faces Strong Competition from Amazon,
COMPUTERWEEKLY (Aug. 15, 2018, 4:15 PM), https://perma.cc/2KRG-TMGK
(“There are general threats to Apple’s dominance, but the biggest shadow cast
over Apple’s future is Amazon.”).
113. E.g., Facebook Portal, Apple HomePod, Amazon Alexa, and Google
Home.
114. E.g., Apple Music, Google Music, and Amazon Music.
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tablets,115 shopping platforms,116 photo platforms,117 and
self-driving cars.118 Because of their intertwined markets, all of
Big Tech should face a comprehensive investigation by a single
agency. Instead, the FTC and DOJ charge a divided path on
tech, beginning with their suits against Facebook and Google.
Despite a relatively narrow case against Google,119 the two suits
still overlap in subject matter, as they both address forms of
online advertising.120 Splitting the Big Four into separate
agency investigations introduces inconsistencies in treatment,
gaps in information, and duplication of effort. The situation is
exacerbated by the agencies’ divergent views towards
intellectual property,121 national security,122 and other issues
that affect technology. The Big Tech clearance agreement is far
worse off than previous proposed clearance agreements, because
prior agreements at least enabled one agency to conduct
consistent enforcement within the industry.
After the agencies reached this clearance agreement, the
DOJ announced a broad antitrust review into technology giants
in July 2019.123 Despite the FTC investigation of Facebook and
Amazon, the DOJ suggested that Facebook and Amazon were in
115. E.g., Amazon tablet, iPad, and Google Nexus.
116. E.g., Amazon shopping, Google shopping, and Facebook marketplace.
117. E.g., Google photos, Amazon photos, iCloud, and Facebook albums.
118. E.g., Apple, Waymo (under Alphabet), and Amazon are all engaged in
self-driving cars.
119. See Katie Benner & Cecilia Kang, Justice Dept. Plans to File Antitrust
Charges Against Google in Coming Weeks, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2020),
https://perma.cc/4Z7X-KU23 (stating that several state attorneys viewed the
DOJ’s suit against Google as too narrow to support).
120. See Complaint at 2, U.S. Dept. of Just. v. Google LLC, No. 20-cv-0310
(D.D.C. Oct. 20 2020), ECF No. 1 (alleging that Google maintained monopolies
in online advertising); Complaint at 2, FTC v. Facebook, Inc., No. 20-cv-03590
(D.D.C. Dec. 9, 2020), ECF No. 3 (alleging that Facebook “monetizes its
personal social networking monopoly principally by selling advertising”).
121. See infra Part I.A.3.
122. See infra Part II.A.
123. See David McLaughlin et al., Trump DOJ Escalates Big Tech Scrutiny
with New Antitrust Probe, BLOOMBERG L. (July 23, 2019, 5:16 PM), https://
perma.cc/B8EW-ASLQ (“The department’s antitrust division disclosed plans
July 23 to scrutinize tech platforms following mounting criticism across
Washington that the companies have become too big and too powerful.”).
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its sights as well.124 The negotiated division did not seem to be
holding up. After discussion, the agencies resolved that the DOJ
and FTC would both pursue Facebook but in regards to different
issues, in order to avoid overlap.125 Nevertheless, disagreements
regarding the clearance agreement arose again. In September
of 2019, FTC Chairman Joe Simons wrote a letter to the DOJ
raising complaints about the Department’s behavior.126
Industry observers have also questioned the overlap between
the agencies.127 While turf wars between the two antitrust
agencies are not new, they reached a new high over the
regulation of the Big Five.128 The heads of both the FTC and
DOJ Antitrust Division admitted to the Senate that any
clearance agreements had broken down and that “squabbles”
between the agencies had wasted time.129
Senators were understandably concerned that the
infighting between the agencies thwarts regulation of Big Tech

124. See id.
125. See McKinnon & Kendall, supra note 23 (“A turf battle over
government scrutiny of Facebook is a key point of contention . . . .”).
126. See id. (“The previously undisclosed letter, signed by FTC Chairman
Joseph Simons, raises the prospect that a longstanding power-sharing
agreement between the agencies is fraying.”).
127. See Diane Bartz, U.S. Justice Department to Open Facebook Antitrust
Investigation: Source, REUTERS (Sept. 25, 2019, 7:52 PM), https://perma.cc
/3DQQ-ME5S; see also McKinnon & Grimaldi, supra note 40
“For the outside observer, such internecine warfare can only
undermine confidence in the agencies and lead to public distrust,”
said Andrew Gavil, a Howard University antitrust law professor.
“It will also needlessly complicate any investigations and leave the
wider technology community guessing as to where the line is
between lawful and unlawful business strategies.”
128. See McKinnon & Kendall, supra note 23 (“While [the DOJ and FTC]
have at times been rivals and engaged in turf battles, employees in both
agencies acknowledge that their interactions lately have become abnormally
strained.”).
129. See Lauren Feiner, Here’s Why the Top Two Antitrust Enforcers in the
US Are Squabbling over Who Gets to Regulate Big Tech, CNBC (Sept. 18, 2019,
10:31 AM), https://perma.cc/82KR-337B (“While both agency officials said they
continue to stick by clearance agreements that prevent overlapping probes,
they admitted there had also been some tension over the agreement at
times.”).
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at a time when it is greatly needed.130 House lawmakers
criticized the agencies for not challenging mergers involving the
Big Four, with one representative calling the agencies
“paralyzed.”131 Congress did not hold back in noting the severe
inefficiencies of the current dual system.132 By the time the DOJ
filed suit against Google in October 2020, a Congressman called
it “long overdue.”133 Critics noted that the delay had given
Facebook years to prepare for an antitrust suit, and the
company had in fact taken steps in that time to integrate its
technologies and deter an easy breakup.134
The FTC and DOJ are currently trying to evaluate previous
mergers involving the tech giants for their effect on competition.
In February 2020, the FTC issued Special Orders to the Big
Five, requiring them to provide information about prior
acquisitions not reported to the antitrust agencies.135 The study
could result in the unwinding of acquisitions made over the past
ten years.136 However, “unscrambling of the eggs” of
already-completed acquisition is difficult and potentially
ineffective.137 Coordinated action under a single agency might
130. See id.
131. Cristiano Lima, House Antitrust Chair Suggests Halting Major Tech
Mergers Until Federal Probes Wrap, POLITICO (Nov. 13, 2019, 5:57 PM), https://
perma.cc/Q7AF-EV82.
132. See id. (“House lawmakers grilled [high ranking officials at the FTC
and DOJ] over concerns that they have done little to challenge mergers by
Google, Facebook, Amazon and Apple.”).
133. Michael Balsamo & Marcy Gordon, Justice Dept. Files Landmark
Antitrust Case Against Google, PBS (Oct. 20, 2020), https://perma.cc/M79A8677.
134. See Brian Fung, Facebook Must Be Broken up, the US Government
Says in a Groundbreaking Lawsuit, CNN (Dec. 10, 2020),
https://perma.cc/6QPZ-8URA (noting that Facebook “moved to tightly
integrate its apps on a technical level”).
135. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC to Examine Past Acquisitions
by Large Technology Companies, (Feb. 11, 2020, 1:00 PM), https://perma.cc/FL82V63H.
136. Emily Birnbaum, FTC to Review Past Acquisitions by Tech Firms,
HILL (Feb. 11, 2020, 12:27 PM), https://perma.cc/TW9Y-SHQB.
137. See Mergers, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://perma.cc/U42B-ETYQ
(noting that premerger notification requirements of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act
are intended to avoid a situation in which a merger has to be reversed).
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well have produced timely action and simpler resolutions
regarding these tech mergers.
3.

Standard-Essential Patents: A Case Study in Incoherence

Turf battles aside, the FTC and the DOJ have promoted
directly opposing policies regarding the application of antitrust
law to technology.138 The contentious disagreement on the
important issue of standard-essential patents shows the
divergent treatment and uncertainty already generated by dual
enforcement. The FTC believes violation of a SEP licensing
agreement
is
potentially
an
antitrust
violation.139
Standard-setting organizations often require patent holders to
license SEPs for free or on fair, reasonable, and
non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms.140 The FTC argues that a
violation of these licensing terms can violate antitrust laws by
enabling a patent holder to “parlay the standardization of its
technology into a monopoly in standard-compliant products.”141
138. See infra Part I.B.
139. See Timothy Syrett, The FTC’s Qualcomm Case Reveals Concerning
Divide with DOJ on Patent Hold-Up, IPWATCHDOG (June 28, 2019), https://
perma.cc/C8MU-ZKZF (discussing the DOJ and FTC’s divergent treatment of
SEPs).
140. See NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL NAT’L ACADS., PATENT CHALLENGES FOR
STANDARD-SETTING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY 51 (Keith Maskus & Stephen A. Merrill eds.,
2013).
141. See Complaint at 49, FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658
(N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 17-cv-00220)
Once a standard incorporating proprietary technology is adopted,
the potential exists for opportunistic patent holders to insist on
patent licensing terms that capture not just the value of the
underlying technology, but also the value of standardization itself.
To address this “hold-up” risk, [standard setting organizations]
often require patent holders to disclose their patents and commit to
license standard-essential patents (“SEPs”) on fair, reasonable, and
non-discriminatory (“FRAND”) terms. Absent such requirements, a
patent holder might be able to parlay the standardization of its
technology into a monopoly in standard-compliant products.
See also STANDARDS, LICENSING, AND INNOVATION: A RESPONSE TO DOJ AAG’S
COMMENTS ON ANTITRUST LAW AND STANDARD-SETTING, FED. TRADE COMM’N 21,
https://perma.cc/M3CA-TM7Y (PDF) (“[W]hen companies promise through
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The DOJ disagrees, because it believes “it is not the duty or the
proper role of antitrust law to referee what unilateral behavior
is reasonable for patent holders in this context.”142 The DOJ
argues that patent holders enjoy a government-granted
monopoly over the item under patent.143 Thus, a violation of a
SEP licensing agreement may raise an issue of contract law or
other common law right, but not antitrust.144
SEPs are vital to technological innovation and economic
growth, with billions of dollars at stake.145 To understand the
importance of SEPs to technology, one must first understand the
importance of a standard. A standard is a uniform practice
around which a technology develops.146 For example, a standard
could describe a specific design of a charging port. Once the
standard is set, multiple devices, from cell phones to speakers,
can be designed to work with that standard charging port.
Standards enable uniformity and operability across

their FRAND commitments not to exercise the market power they gained from
incorporation of their patents into standards but then breach those
commitments, they are exercising market power they acquired by promising
to forgo that exercise.”).
142. Makin Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t Just., Remarks at
the USC Gould School of Law’s Center for Transnational Law and Business
Conference (Nov. 10, 2017) [hereinafter USC Speech], https://perma.cc/DNF98RZS (last updated Nov. 14, 2017).
143. See id. (“Patents are a form of property, and the right to exclude is
one of the most fundamental bargaining rights a property owner possesses.”).
144. See id.
If a patent holder is alleged to have violated a commitment to a
standard setting organization, that action may have some impact
on competition. But, I respectfully submit, that does not mean the
heavy hand of antitrust necessarily is the appropriate remedy for
the would-be licensee—or the enforcement agency. There are
perfectly adequate and more appropriate common law and
statutory remedies available to the SSO or its members.
145. Mark A. Lemley & Timothy Simcoe, How Essential Are
Standard-Essential Patents?, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 607, 607 (2019).
146. See CHARLES M. SCHMIDT, BEST PRACTICES FOR TECHNICAL STANDARD
CREATION, MITRE 1 (Apr. 2017), https://perma.cc/Y4WK-XNWB (PDF)
(“Technical standards support the unification of practice with regard to some
technical activity through a precise description of that activity.”).
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manufacturers, devices, or platforms.147 We interact with and
depend on countless technology standards such as USB,
Bluetooth, HTML, and 3G in our everyday life. Their
importance cannot be overstated: they provide the foundation
for the development and implementation of technology.148
Despite their benefits, standards also present a dilemma:
they are most beneficial when there is widespread adoption.149
But most entities, from companies to countries, want to have
their own individual designs become standard so as to gain a
competitive advantage.150 Thus, there must be some process

147. See id. (“Uniformity of practice allows defenders to concentrate their
efforts on a small number of defensive products and tools that then are able to
protect multiple types of devices, applications, and functional roles within the
enterprise.”).
148. See Understanding How Technical Standards Are Made &
Maintained, IEEE, https://perma.cc/2ZXS-93AK (“Standards are used by
people around the world, in various industries and professions. From
healthcare, to education, energy, construction, environment, technology and
more, published specifications and procedures help maximize the reliability of
materials, products, methods, and services.”).
149. Standards facilitate the interoperability of products and services, so
their usefulness increases with the number of adopters due to network effects.
See Neil Gandal, Compatibility, Standardization, and Network Effects: Some
Policy Implications, 18 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 80, 81 (2002) (“Because of
the network effects that are inherent in [the high-tech consumer electronic
products industry], successful diffusion of these [electronic] products is often
contingent on a single product winning a battle of market standards or firms
achieving compatibility among competing standards.”); see also Robert L.
Mallett, Why Standards Matter, 15 ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 63, 63 (1999)
(“Divergent standards peculiar to a nation or region, complex conformity
assessment requirements, and a thicket of other standards-related barriers
have been estimated to impede the sale of an additional $20 billion to $40
billion worth of U.S. goods and services.”).
150. See Mallett, supra note 149, at 66 (“We must act determinedly and
intelligently to advance U.S. technologies and concepts as the basis for
international standards.”); see also Sangin Park, Quantitative Analysis of
Network Externalities in Competing Technologies: The VCR Case, 86 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 937, 939 (2004) (explaining the standards war between JVC’s
VHS and Sony’s Betamax technologies for the video cassette recording (VCR)
technology market, wherein Sony lost business to JVC and eventually
switched to producing VHS over its own Betamax technology).
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that encourages collaboration and consensus even among
competitors.151
Such collaboration is facilitated by a standards
development organization (SDO) or standard setting
organization (SSO), which creates, revises, and coordinates
technical standards.152 Standards development organizations
have rules and criteria to prevent a single interest from
dominating the definition of a standard.153 Their rules govern
how they approach patented technologies.154 For example, an
SDO may require that only unpatented technologies can be
adopted as standard. Thus, in deciding what charging port will
be the industry standard, the SDO would reject any charging
ports that were patented. While this is, in a sense, a
procompetitive solution—no entity would have a monopoly over
the standard technology that was decided upon—it is largely
unrealistic in today’s world where most useful and current
inventions are patented. Adopting an unpatented technology
that is outdated as standard defeats the purpose of a standard,

151. See Patricia R. Harris, Why Standards Matter, 1 PORTAL: LIBR. &
ACAD. 525, 526 (2001) (“Standards . . . do not emerge without costs, without
time, without effort and contributions from the individuals and businesses
that embrace a vision and are committed to addressing and solving a problem
they share.”).
152. See Develop Standards: What Are Standards?, IEEE STANDARDS
ASS’N, https://perma.cc/C8MM-H2QL (“Typically, each SDO is comprised of
Boards, Committees and staff who establish and maintain the policies,
procedures and guidelines that help ensure the integrity of the standards
development process, and the standards that are generated as an outcome of
this process.”).
153. See id. (“To build consensus through democratic means, participants
engage in meetings, draft and review position pieces, create and review
presentations, examine data and engage in active discussion and debate to
resolve outstanding issues.”).
154. See IEE SA Standards Board: Patcom, IEEE STANDARDS ASS’N,
https://perma.cc/R82X-DXBR (“[Patent Committee] provides oversight for the
use of any patents and patent information in IEEE standards. The committee
will review any patent information submitted to the IEEE SA to determine
conformity with patent procedures and guidelines.”).
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which is to facilitate the development and adoption of innovative
technology.155
As a result, SDOs must contend with standard-essential
patents (SEPs), patents that are necessary for the
implementation of a standardized technology.156 SDOs typically
require that if a proposed standard is encumbered by patents,
those patents must be licensed on “fair, reasonable, and
non-discriminatory” (FRAND) terms to those seeking to utilize
the technology.157 This requirement is thought to facilitate the
adoption of the standard in the industry while providing fair
terms to all parties involved.158 Because standards are critical
to
almost
everything
that
touches
technology,
standard-essential patents are as well. When a patent is
essential to a standard, there is no way to comply with the
standard without infringing or licensing the patent.159 A dispute
over a single SEP can prevent a company from making its
product compatible with the internet, computers, or mobile
devices.160 For example, a typical cellphone charging port has
SEPs that cover every part of its design, from the electronic
circuitry to communication protocols. Methods that enable a
mobile phone to stay connected to a 4G/LTE network are
155. See Develop Standards, supra note 152 (“[S]tandards fuel the
development and implementation of technologies that influence and transform
the way we live, work and communicate.”).
156. See Gene Quinn, Standard Essential Patents: The Myths and
Realities of Standard Implementation, IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 4, 2019), https://
perma.cc/CE6W-M773 (“[SEPs] represent core, pioneering innovation that
entire industries will build upon. These patents protect innovation that has
taken extraordinary effort to achieve.”).
157. Thomas F. Cotter, Comparative Law and Economics of
Standard-Essential Patents and FRAND Royalties, 22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
311, 312 (2014).
158. Most SDOs also require a disclosure of any standard-essential
patents before approval of the standard. See Lorenz Brachtendorf et al.,
Approximating the Standard Essentiality of Patents—A Semantics-Based
Analysis 3 (June 4, 2019) (draft prepared for 12th Searle Conference on
Innovation Economics), https://perma.cc/TN9U-BB5P.
159. See Lemley & Simcoe, supra note 145, at 609 (“Unlike most other
patents, when a patent is truly essential there is no way to design around it
and still comply with the standard.”).
160. See id.
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covered by a multitude of SEPs that are essential to the 4G/LTE
standard.161 Qualcomm owns SEPs essential to widely adopted
cellular communication standards such as CDMA and LTE.162
A competition problem arises when, despite any agreement
made at the time a standard was chosen, SEPs are later not
licensed at fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms.
When the owner of a SEP bars a competitor from utilizing a SEP
and therefore a standard technology, this decision deals a huge
blow to the competitor. The FTC believes that when a
SEP-owner violates an agreement to license the SEP on fair,
reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms, this is an
anticompetitive action in violation of antitrust laws.163 In FTC
v. Qualcomm,164 the FTC pursued action against Qualcomm
under Section 5 of the FTC Act for refusing to license its SEPs
to competitors.165
In contrast, the DOJ has taken the stance that SEP owners
refusing to license on FRAND terms is not an anticompetitive
antitrust violation.166 It is simply a patent owner exercising his
or her earned right to exclude competitors. As dictated under
patent law doctrine, a patent owner has the right to prevent
anyone from utilizing his or her patented technology.167 Going
161. See Your Phone, Our Technology: How Patents Make It Possible,
ERICSSON (Sept. 13, 2018), https://perma.cc/JAG7-JBZM (“It is impossible to
manufacture 4G/LTE standard-compliant products such as smartphones or
tablets without using technologies covered by one or more SEP.”).
162. See Joe Raffetto et al., FTC v. Qualcomm: Court Requires Licensing
of Standard Essential Patents to Competitors, IPWATCHDOG (Dec. 9, 2018),
https://perma.cc/S6D6-JNLX.
163. See supra notes 139–141 and accompanying text.
164. 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020).
165. See Raffetto et al., supra note 162 (describing the nature of the case).
166. See USC Speech, supra note 142 (“A patent holder cannot violate the
antitrust laws by properly exercising the rights patents confer, such as seeking
an injunction or refusing to license such a patent.”).
167. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)
Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a grant
to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others
from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention
throughout the United States or importing the invention into the
United States, and, if the invention is a process, of the right to
exclude others from using, offering for sale or selling throughout
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forward, it is uncertain whether the government will pursue
antitrust enforcement actions related to the licensing of SEPs.168
This disagreement between the DOJ and the FTC rippled
out to cause concern in the legislative branch. Because of the
DOJ’s disagreement with the FTC, Senators wrote to the DOJ
urging the agency to clarify its policy and provide guidance to
stakeholders.169 The uncertainty created by this bifurcated
approach creates dissatisfaction in Congress and so undermines

the United States, or importing into the United States, products
made by that process, referring to the specification for the
particulars thereof.
168. In the early 2000s, both agencies agreed that SEPs were subject to
antitrust enforcement. See Syrett, supra note 139 (“[T]he FTC and DOJ had
worked both in parallel and together to address the potential competitive
harms posed by patent hold-up.”). During this period of agreement, the
agencies issued a joint statement. See U.S. DEP’T JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N,
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 3 (2007), https://perma.cc/K48Q-A4LY (PDF). In
2007, the FTC and DOJ joint report on antitrust and intellectual property
rights explained their position on SEPs, citing competitive harms that would
result if FRAND commitments of SEPs were not enforced. Id. at 47.
Specifically, the report warned that if SEPs were not required to be licensed
at fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms, as were agreed upon at the
time of the approval of the standard, the problem of patent hold-up would
occur. Id. Patent hold-up arises when a patent owner is able to extract a higher
royalty or concession for his or her patent than it would have warranted ex
ante. Thomas F. Cotter et al., Demystifying Patent Holdup, 76 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1501, 150507 (2019).
The period of harmony between the antitrust agencies regarding
SEPs was put to an end five years later. In 2018, Makan Delrahim, the head
of the DOJ Antitrust Division, formally withdrew the DOJ’s approval of the
prior 2013 joint policy statement, stating that the DOJ is “committed to
ensuring that patent holders maintain their full constitutional right to seek
an injunction against infringement.” Memorandum from Makan Dalrahim,
U.S. Dep’t Just., “Telegraph Road”: Incentivizing Innovation at the
Intersection of Patent and Antitrust Law 14 (Dec. 7, 2018), https://perma.cc
/LQ4C-52Y9 (PDF).
169. See Norman Armstrong et al., Senators Urge DOJ to Develop
Antitrust Guidance for Licensing of Standard Essential Patents, JD SUPRA
(Oct. 25, 2019), https://perma.cc/4K9C-4MET (describing the letter as a
“request for clarity [which] stems, in large part, to a recent shift in the DOJ’s
position as to FRAND issues”).
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support for these agencies among those who control their
funding.170
The disagreement between the DOJ and FTC has
international implications as well. Divergence in treatment of
FRAND agreements among countries already causes difficulties
for companies operating under different national standards in
the global economy.171 These international challenges are
further exacerbated by the different policies of the two domestic
antitrust enforcement agencies of the United States, still the
most important commercial nation in the world.172 Companies
are subject to potentially conflicting standards depending not
only on the national identity of the enforcement agency but also
on the identity of the agency with the United States.
International harmonization becomes more difficult if the
United States has internal disagreements. Therefore, the case

170. Cf. Leah Nylen, DOJ Seeks 71 Percent Bump from Congress for
Antitrust, POLITICO (Feb. 14, 2020, 5:32 PM), https://perma.cc/Q7MM-XG9H
(discussing DOJ’s budget request for a 71 percent increase in funding for the
antitrust division). Other agencies also changed their position to align with
DOJ, creating a split with the FTC’s policies. The United States Patent and
Trademark Office put out a joint statement with DOJ on the subject. See U.S.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., & U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., POLICY STATEMENT ON REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS
SUBJECT TO VOLUNTARY F/RAND COMMITMENTS 6 (2019), https://perma.cc
/BG6Y-QBU6 (PDF) (rejecting “a special set of legal rules that limit remedies
for infringement of standards-essential patents subject to a F/RAND
commitment”). The International Trade Commission, a domestic agency which
handles many patent disputes, issued injunctive relief to a SEP owner in the
same year. See Michael T. Renaud et al., Out with the Old, and in with the
New: Joint Policy Statement and Recent Cases Confirm That Injunctive Relief
on Standard-Essential Patents Is Available at the ITC, MINTZ (Dec. 23, 2019),
https://perma.cc/U4G3-N83V.
171. See Patrick Wingrove, FRAND Divergence Stifles Global Licensing
Strategies, MANAGING IP (Aug. 7, 2019), https://perma.cc/9MGR-N7BK (“With
steady divergence of what constitutes fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory
(FRAND) terms in licenses for standard essential patents, some in-house
counsel say the disparate treatment of IP across the world is stifling their
global licensing strategies.”).
172. See Jacqueline Yin, Delrahim Out of Step With FTC, Industry,
Academics on FRAND/SEP, PAT. PROGRESS (Apr. 11, 2019), https://perma.cc
/RX62-XPGU (arguing that the DOJ’s interpretation causes international
conflict and that the DOJ should instead follow the FTC’s approach).
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of SEPs shows how dual enforcement has created uncertainty in
the industry, in Congress, and internationally.
B.

Dual Enforcement Causes Inefficiencies and Inconsistent
Outcomes

Technology did not create, but only exacerbates
long-standing problems of dual antitrust enforcement. In this
subpart we briefly offer more general arguments against joint
enforcement by the FTC and Antitrust Division. It wastes
resources, and even in non-technological areas, it creates
uncertainty.173 Both waste and uncertainty are compounded by
turf wars, as exemplified by conflicts over mergers.174
Moreover, Congress never intended for a system of full dual
enforcement.175 Thus, eliminating it would not undermine a
fully deliberated scheme. Single enforcement would additionally
bring the United States in conformity with industrialized
nations worldwide, which generally have a single antitrust
enforcer.176 Finally, we respond to the argument that single
agency enforcement would not improve matters much because
private actors can enforce antitrust.177 Private enforcers are
subject to heavy restrictions and do not have the same ability to
direct antitrust policy as the agencies do.
1.

Waste and Uncertainty

Requiring two agencies with two sets of staff to perform
similar tasks creates costs and waste. As Ernest Gellhorn noted,
“These costs are particularly pronounced in labor-intensive
bureaus [such as the FTC and DOJ Antitrust Division] where
lawyers and economists are the principal resource.”178 The DOJ
Antitrust Division requested $166.8 million from Congress in

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

See infra Part I.B.1.
See infra notes 186–188 and accompanying text.
See infra Part I.B.2.
See infra Part I.B.3.
See infra Part I.B.4.
Gellhorn, supra note 19.
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2020 to support their 695 positions and 335 attorneys.179 In the
same year, the FTC requested over $312 million to support
1,140 positions.180 In total, the country spent over $470 million
in 2019 on antitrust efforts, much of which could have been
saved absent the dual agency structure.181 Dual enforcement
results in duplicated efforts and unnecessary expenditures.182
When power is diffused across multiple actors, no single actor is
truly empowered, resulting in inefficiencies and a lack of
accountability.183
Additionally, the FTC and DOJ Antitrust Division must
coordinate workflow with each other.184 Such coordination
wastes agency time that could be spent directly on
enforcement.185 For instance, since 1938, the two agencies have
held numerous conferences in attempts to divide and coordinate
their responsibilities related to merger review.186 Despite minor
improvements, the negative effects of a two-agency antitrust
enforcement system persist. Merger clearance is still
inconsistent and contentious between the FTC and DOJ. Its

179. DEP’T OF JUST., FY 2020 BUDGET REQUEST AT A GLANCE 1, https://
perma.cc/5423-E5R4 (PDF).
180. FED. TRADE COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2020 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
JUSTIFICATION 2 (2019), https://perma.cc/NGQ8-KDY2 (PDF).
181. Id.; DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 179, at 3.
182. Blumenthal, supra note 37, at 2930.
183. See SITARAMAN, supra note 89, at 8 (describing the problems that
arise when power is diffused).
184. See id. at 14 (noting that the agencies must determine which agency
has power to review a merger in each case prior to conducting the review);
Garry A. Gabison, Dual Enforcement of Electric Utility Mergers and
Acquisitions, 17 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 11, 3436 (2017) (describing the problems
under a dual enforcement system).
185. See SITARAMAN, supra note 89, at 14 (“In some cases, the agencies
take up more than half of the pre-merger review time period (30 days)
determining which agency has the power to review the merger, leaving the
agency with little time to conduct a robust review.”).
186. See David L. Roll, Dual Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws by the
Department of Justice and the FTC: The Liaison Procedure, 31 BUS. LAW. 2075,
2077 (1976) (describing the agencies’ efforts to coordinate enforcement).
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long history suggests that this problem will continue so long as
two antitrust agencies exist.187
Dual enforcement also leads to missed enforcement
opportunities. Under § 7 of the Clayton Act,188 both agencies are
charged with the prevention of monopolies.189 The Act prohibits
mergers of companies that would substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly.190 In 1976, the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act (HSR Act)191
was passed, which enabled the agencies to investigate mergers
before they happened and also provided procedures for
coordinating merger review between the agencies.192 The HSR
Act required each antitrust agency to obtain clearance from the
other before opening an investigation, and the Act additionally
established time limits for the process.193 Deciding which agency
had the go-ahead in a timely and organized manner proved
difficult.194 Due to HSR time limits, if the agencies could not
187. Dual enforcement has rightfully been the subject of scrutiny for
decades. See, e.g., Kovacic, supra note 1, at 507 (“Each aspect of U.S. antitrust
enforcement, including dual federal jurisdiction, has received close scrutiny.”);
Milton Handler, Reforming the Antitrust Laws, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1287,
131920 (1982); Ernest Gellhorn et al., Has Antitrust Outgrown Dual
Enforcement? A Proposal for Rationalization, 35 ANTITRUST BULL. 695, 701
(1990) (stating that dual enforcement is “inefficient and misguided”); Darren
Bush, Out of the DOJ Ashes Rises the FTC Phoenix: How to Enhance Antitrust
Enforcement by Eliminating an Antitrust Enforcement Agency, 53 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 33, 34 (2016). Previous criticism has not focused on the impact of
technology, especially modern technology, on antitrust enforcement. Cf. id. at
52 (proposing a single enforcement scheme without discussing the impact of
technology under the current scheme or the proposal).
188. 15 U.S.C. § 18.
189. See id. § 18a (vesting enforcement authority in both the FTC and the
DOJ).
190. Id. § 18.
191. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18a).
192. Kelly Signs, Milestones in FTC History: HSR Act Launches Effective
Premerger Review, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Mar. 16, 2015, 8:00 AM), https://perma.cc
/PK5Z-GFEF.
193. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(d) (setting out premerger procedures).
194. See Lauren Kearney Peay, The Cautionary Tale of the Failed 2002
FTC/DOJ Merger Clearance Accord, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1307, 131516 (2007)
(describing the initial difficulties of resolving clearance disputes).
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agree on which agency would conduct the investigation, both
agencies would miss their chance to resolve possible antitrust
violations.195 Valuable investigation time was often wasted by
agency turf battles over clearance.196 Such battles over cases
also undermine agency morale, further hurting agency
efficiency.197
In attempts to streamline the clearance process, the FTC
and DOJ agreed to joint guidelines in 1993.198 The guidelines
delineated which agency had expertise in different product
areas, but clearance disputes continued to drag on: neither
agency had the incentive to defer to the other, regardless of
expertise.199 Another inter-agency agreement in 1995 similarly
failed to improve matters.200 Between 1999 and 2002, one or
both agencies sought clearance on approximately 1,250
matters.201 On average, 24 percent of those matters resulted in
delays of three weeks or a cumulative delay of more than
seventeen years.202 In 2002, the agencies tried yet again,
proposing a clearance agreement that would permanently
divide mergers between the agencies based upon industry.203

195. See id. at 1315 (“Under the HSR Act, these investigations were
constrained by statutorily enforced time limits. If the agencies failed to resolve
disputes in a timely fashion, they risked missing the only window of
opportunity for thwarting the merger before it occurred.”).
196. See id. at 1316 (“Clearance disputes [took up] a considerable
percentage of the thirty-day waiting period, leaving the ‘winning’ agency with
a truncated period of time within which to investigate . . . .”).
197. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
iv (2007), https://perma.cc/8SMF-Y92U (PDF) [hereinafter 2007ANTITRUST
MODERNIZATION REPORT].
198. Peay, supra note 194, at 1315.
199. Id. at 1316 (describing the effect of the 1993 guidelines).
200. Id. at 1317.
201. FTC Releases Antitrust Clearance Process Documents, FED. TRADE
COMM’N (Feb. 27, 2002), https://perma.cc/GK7N-JA8N.
202. See id.
203. See Kris Dekeyser et al., Coordination Among National Antitrust
Agencies, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 43, 51 (2009) (“In 2002, the DOJ and FTC
announces the creation of a Memorandum of Agreement . . . that delineated
the industry sectors that were to fall under each agency’s purview, and the
divisions would be permanent.”).
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This time, the clearance agreement was blocked by the
Senate.204
Clearance battles are also harmful because they create
uncertainty. With two sets of directions, companies waste
resources attempting to adhere to both guidelines as is
feasible.205 For example, the agencies have different merger
procedures:206 the FTC can pursue action through its
administrative court, while the DOJ must litigate before Article
III courts.207 This results in significantly unequal power in
seeking permanent injunctions during merger investigations.208
The FTC usually only seeks a preliminary injunction in court,
retaining the option to pursue a permanent injunction through
its internal administrative litigation process.209 The DOJ
usually agrees with the merging parties to consolidate
proceedings for preliminary and permanent injunctions, which
forces it to meet a higher burden of proof.210 As a result, the
outcome of a merger may turn on which antitrust agency is
reviewing it.211
204. See id.
205. See Kovacic, supra note 1, at 521 (“If agencies apply dissimilar
analytical techniques or standards, a fourth cost of competition and
redundancy is the expense that businesses incur to evaluate commercial plans
and strategies under both sets of enforcement approaches.”).
206. Blumenthal, supra note 37, at 2930.
207. Gabison, supra note 184, at 24.
208. See id. (noting that the DOJ must meet a higher standard of proof
than the FTC); Raymond Z. Ling, Unscrambling the Organic Eggs: The
Growing Divergence between the DOJ and the FTC in Merger Review after
Whole Foods, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 935, 938 (2010) (“[T]he FTC’s lower
preliminary injunction standard and its ability to commence administrative
litigation gives the FTC a significant advantage over the DOJ in challenging
a merger and extracting a settlement, a result that is unacceptable in a dual
enforcement system.”).
209. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 197, at 138
(stating that the FTC has “statutory authority to secure permanent relief
through administrative litigation, an avenue not available to the DOJ”).
210. See id. at 139. While the House in 2018 passed legislation aimed at
eliminating this inequality, the bill was never passed by the Senate. See H.R.
5645 (115th): Standard Merger and Acquisition Reviews Through Equal Rules
Act of 2018, GOVTRACK, https://perma.cc/FY9Z-DVGY.
211. See Ling, supra note 208, at 938.
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Even when the agencies follow the same procedures, they
apply them differently, leading to different results based on
which agency handles the case212 and creating inconsistencies
in the enforcement of the law.213 At times, one agency approves
conduct that the other agency rejects.214 For example, DOJ
leadership under the Trump administration is skeptical of
behavioral remedies in vertical mergers, while the FTC has
continued to apply behavioral remedies when approving vertical
mergers.215 Thus, conflicts between the FTC and DOJ even
outside the technology context persist to the present day.216

212. See Blumenthal, supra note 37, at 30 (stating that disparate outcomes
result from differing views about the application of substantive antitrust law).
213. SITARAMAN, supra note 89, at 7.
214. See Handler, supra note 187, at 1319; see also FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc.,
411 F. Supp. 3d 658, 683 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (finding for the FTC, which alleged
that Qualcomm’s conduct violated antitrust laws, despite the DOJ’s approval
of Qualcomm’s conduct).
215. See Browdie et al., supra note 72, at 77. Behavioral or conduct
remedies allow mergers to proceed subject to specified behavioral
commitments, such as non-discrimination provisions, mandatory licensing,
anti-retaliation provisions, or prohibitions on certain contracting practices.
U.S. DEP’T JUST., ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER REMEDIES 13
(2011), https://perma.cc/6BQ7-T4PM (PDF); John E. Kowka & Diana L. Moss,
Behavioral Merger Remedies: Evaluation and Implications for Antitrust
Enforcement, AM. ANTITRUST INST. 4 (2011), https://perma.cc/G7LD-PWU7
(PDF). In contrast, structural remedies typically require divestiture of a
business entity or assets, which enables the divested entity to act as an
independent firm. See id. at 4–6 (comparing structural remedies to behavioral
remedies).
216. As recently as May 2020, economists, legal scholars, and practitioners
submitted a joint letter to Congress, calling on the legislature to help solve
inefficiencies caused by the country’s unique system of antitrust enforcement.
See JOINT SUBMISSION OF ANTITRUST ECONOMISTS, LEGAL SCHOLARS, AND
PRACTITIONERS TO THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE ON THE STATE OF
ANTITRUST LAW AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PROTECTING COMPETITION IN DIGITAL
MARKETS 13 (May 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/2QN4-JJP3 (PDF) (“Congress
could enhance enforcement efficiency and efficacy by harmonizing the
agencies’ procedures and by clearly articulating their respective
responsibilities . . . .”).
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The Accidental Origins of Dual Enforcement

Creating a unified antitrust enforcement agency would not
reverse a fully deliberated decision of Congress: to the contrary,
it would right an accidental duplication that was not
anticipated.217 As Jason Marisam has noted, “[D]uplicative
delegations are largely incidental and unintentional
creations.”218 The overlapping jurisdiction between the DOJ
Antitrust Division and the FTC is no exception. The agencies
were never intended to serve the same role as antitrust
enforcers.219
The Department of Justice’s antitrust enforcement began in
1903, when Congress earmarked money for antitrust
enforcement and created the Antitrust Attorney General
position.220 In the same year, President Roosevelt created the
Bureau of Corporations, the FTC’s predecessor.221 The DOJ was
the prime litigator in antitrust cases and sought to enforce the
Sherman Act222 which was passed by Congress to address
antitrust concerns.223 However, the results varied widely from
court to court, with the judiciary placing much of the power in
their own hands.224 Congress was not pleased with these judicial
217. See Harry First et al., Procedural and Institutional Norms in
Antitrust Enforcement: The U.S. System 3 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of L., Working
Paper No. 12-18, 2012) (stating that Congress did not anticipate the two
agencies to have “overlapping enforcement authority”).
218. Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 184
(2011).
219. See First et al., supra note 217, at 3 (“At the time the statutes were
enacted . . . Congress apparently saw the two agencies as focusing on
competition problems in different ways and using different procedures.”).
220. Gregory J. Werden, Establishment of the Antitrust Division of the
U.S. Department of Justice, 92 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 419, 42425 (2018). The DOJ
Antitrust Division was formally established a few years later in 1919. Id. at
42526.
221. Our History, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://perma.cc/9U86-QX6M.
222. 15 U.S.C. §§ 138.
223. See First et al., supra note 217, at 3 (stating that Congress anticipated
the DOJ to continue litigating antitrust cases while the FTC engaged in
“preventative regulation”).
224. See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911)
(establishing the Rule of Reason); Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of “Unfair
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interpretations and sought to create a commission to carry out
their original vision.225 They created the Federal Trade
Commission in 1914 in an attempt to cut down on the
divergences between courts and to shift control over antitrust
policy away from the courts.226 Ironically, the creation of the
FTC and subsequent overlapping jurisdiction has divided
executive authority.
At the time of the FTC’s creation, Congress believed the
DOJ and FTC would take on different roles in antitrust law.
Most fundamentally, they believed the DOJ would enforce
antitrust against those who violated the law while the FTC
would regulate the behavior of corporations, preventing
monopolies from occurring in the first place.227 Congress,
however, failed to expressly differentiate the roles that it
intended the agencies to play.228 When the FTC Act was passed,
the agency had broad powers that intersected with those of the
DOJ. Crucially, the two agencies have concurrent authority over
§§ 2, 3, 7, and 8 of the Clayton Act and the Sherman Act.229
These statutes are significant and cover everything from
mergers and civil nonmerger investigations to noncriminal
pricing conspiracies.230 It is under this shared authority that
Methods of Competition” in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 21
B.C. L. REV. 227, 233 (1980).
225. See First et al., supra note 217, at 23 (discussing the congressional
response to Standard Oil); Averitt, supra note 224, at 233 (same).
226. See Averitt, supra note 224, at 23336 (describing the Congressional
effort to wrest control from the courts); Our History, supra note 221.
227. First et al., supra note 217, at 3 (describing the DOJ’s intended role
as handling existing monopolies and the FTC’s role as engaging in
“preventative regulation”).
228. See id. (“Congress paid no attention to the potential for conflict
between the agencies.”).
229. U.S. DEP’T JUST., ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL VII-3 (5th ed. 2012)
https://perma.cc/5MVP-R2JF (PDF) [hereinafter DOJ ANTITRUST DIVISION
MANUAl]; see The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://perma.cc/JS77ME9Q (stating that while the FTC does not have direct jurisdiction over the
Sherman Act, the Supreme Court has ruled that violations of the Sherman Act
also violate the FTC Act).
230. First et al., supra note 217, at 3. It is true that the agencies have some
differences in jurisdiction. For example, the DOJ exclusively handles criminal
antitrust cases and the FTC exclusively handles civil Robinson-Patman Act
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many conflicts have arisen, culminating in the far-reaching
conflicts brought on by our technological age. Consolidating
enforcement would eliminate much duplication that Congress
never intended.
3.

Worldwide Trend of Single Enforcement

Other countries that had similar overlapping jurisdiction
problems in antitrust enforcement have recently consolidated
enforcement into a single agency, making the dual enforcement
in the United States even more anomalous. For example, Brazil
restructured its own dispersed competition authorities into a
single agency in 2011.231 In 2018, China passed legislation to
amalgamate its three antitrust bodies into one.232 The United
States is no stranger to consolidation of competition law itself.
In 1989, regulation of mergers in the trucking and airline
industries was moved from the Department of Transportation
to the DOJ Antitrust Division.233 Creating a single enforcement
agency for antitrust would thus be consonant with both
international and domestic trends.
4.

Private Antitrust Suits Do Not Support Continued Dual
Agency Enforcement

To be sure, removing the FTC’s antitrust jurisdiction would
not prevent private antitrust suits. The Sherman and Clayton
Acts provide a private right of action.234 For every antitrust case
matters, which are related to price discrimination. DOJ ANTITRUST DIVISION
MANUAL, supra note 222, at VII-3.
231. See Tito Amaral de Andrade et al., Brazil: Merger Control, GLOB.
COMPETITION REV. (Sept. 19, 2019), https://perma.cc/EN83-ZHQZ (describing
the restructuring legislation as some of the most important governance over
merger review in Brazil); Spencer Weber Waller, The Omega Man or the
Isolation of U.S. Antitrust Law, 52 CONN. L. REV. 123, 178 (2020) (comparing
the dual system in the United States with the single agency systems in Brazil).
232. Noah A. Brumfield et al., China Merges Antitrust Enforcement
Agencies into One, as Its Anti-Monopoly Law Approaches 10th Anniversary,
WHITE & CASE LLP (Mar. 29, 2018), https://perma.cc/J94K-ZB7R.
233. Gabison, supra note 184, at 37.
234. See DANIEL A. CRANE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT 51 (2011) (stating that the private right of action was likely
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brought by the FTC or DOJ, there are about ten cases brought
by private actors.235 Private antitrust litigation is often
motivated by business objectives, with companies strategically
filing suit against rivals.236 These private actions may be
uncoordinated with the country’s domestic policy interests,
causing headaches for the government. For example, a private
antitrust litigant has the right to bring an action against a
foreign defendant, even if the foreign defendant’s behavior was
permitted by foreign law.237
That said, the existence of private litigants is not a strong
argument against consolidating the DOJ and the FTC.
Deadlocks and disorganization at the federal agency level are
much more problematic than any unpredictability resulting
from private action. The FTC and DOJ are repeat actors with
institutional knowledge and large staffs devoted to bringing
antitrust cases.238 Repeat actors in an area of law have outsize
power to shape it, because they can make strategic and
long-term litigation decisions to shape the rules to their
advantage.239 And no antitrust plaintiff is as much a repeat
player in antitrust as the Department of Justice and the FTC.
In a technical area like antitrust,240 the professional staffs of the

intended to be “a supplement to public enforcement,” but it is exercised more
often than framers of the Acts likely imagined).
235. See id. at 63.
236. See id. at 50.
237. Hannah Buxbaum, The Private Attorney General in a Global Age:
Public Interests in Private International Antitrust Litigation, 26 YALE J. INT’L
L. 219, 225 (2001). A private litigant is vested “with the power to assert
domestic policy even in situations in which a government agency, considering
the international implications of such an action, might decline to do so.” Id. at
237.
238. See supra notes 178–180 and accompanying text.
239. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 112 (1974).
240. See William E. Kovacic, Evaluating Antitrust Experiments: Using Ex
Post Assessments of Government Enforcement Decisions to Inform Competition
Policy, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 843, 850 (2001) (“To a degree unmatched in other
fields of economic regulation, the elaboration of antitrust doctrine draws upon
the contributions of economic theory.”).

ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT

351

agencies can influence courts to a far greater degree.241 The
reach of these agencies is not limited to the cases they bring.
The agencies also file amicus briefs, and these can be very
influential.242
Moreover, private antitrust action is limited by many
constraints not imposed on federal agencies. For example,
private plaintiffs must prove a personal injury in antitrust
suits.243 This standing requirement proves an obstacle in
challenging mergers: plaintiffs must not only prove that the
merger is anticompetitive, but also that the post-merger firm
would do something anticompetitive that harms them
personally.244 To bring suit under a theory of monopolization, a
private litigant must be a direct purchaser of the alleged
monopolist to have standing.245 In the realm of international
affairs, forum selection and choice of law clauses and the rise of
arbitration provide a barrier to private antitrust action.246 The
antitrust agencies have significantly more power in antitrust
law than private litigants. It is important that this power is
wielded in a unified and orderly way.

241. See, e.g., id. at 853–54 (stating that the FTC’s professional staff
conducts studies to evaluate the agency’s past enforcement decisions).
242. See Stephen Calkins, The Antitrust Conversation, 68 ANTITRUST L.J.
625, 628 (2001) (discussing the influence of DOJ and FTC amicus briefs).
243. Dan Butrymowicz, Antitrust Violation vs. Injury-in-Fact: A Distinction
That Makes a Difference, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Feb. 26, 2016, 11:16 AM), https://
perma.cc/GY4Z-P2S2.
244. Paul F. Brzyski, Collateral Damage: Private Merger Lawsuits in the
Wake of Section 2’s Contraction, 68 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 119, 132 (2019).
245. See Case Comment, Clayton Antitrust Act and Sherman Antitrust
Act—Antitrust Trade and Regulation—Antitrust Standing—Apple Inc. v.
Pepper, 133 HARV. L. REV. 382, 382 (2019) (“Indirect purchasers, who
transacted with these direct purchasers rather than with the monopolist itself,
had no standing, even if the direct purchaser ‘passed on’ the full cost of the
monopolistic overcharge in the form of higher prices.”).
246. See Buxbaum, supra note 237, at 237–45 (examining the role of
foreign arbitration and choice-of-law clauses in domestic regulatory cases).
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ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT SHOULD BE CONSOLIDATED
WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

With the understanding that dual enforcement cannot
continue, this Part explains why antitrust enforcement is best
placed under the DOJ’s Antitrust Division. We first show that
the DOJ, not the FTC, should be the choice because antitrust
now has serious foreign policy and national security
ramifications in our technological era that must be handled by
an agency directly responsible to the president, who controls the
numerous other mechanisms for dealing with such issues.247 We
next show that removing the FTC from antitrust will have the
substantial added advantage of improving its oversight of
privacy—a consumer protection matter also given new
prominence by technology.
A.

Antitrust Policy Increasingly Implicates Foreign Policy

Antitrust law has always affected foreign policy. That much
is evident in the various international antitrust organizations
and agreements in existence.248 Enforcement decisions, even
those involving only domestic companies, have political and
economic ramifications for the United States internationally.249
247. E.g., the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the State
Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, foreign ambassadors, and
treaties.
248. The International Competition Network, Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and Inter-American
Competition Alliance are some of the many international antitrust
organizations. RANDOLPH TRITELL & ELIZABETH KRAUS, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION’S INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PROGRAM 6
(2019), https://perma.cc/7MQV-26DC (PDF). On their websites, the DOJ and
FTC provide extensive lists of international competition and consumer
protection agreements entered into by the United States. See generally
International Competition and Consumer Protection Cooperation Agreements,
FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://perma.cc/SZZ8-EM9R; Antitrust Cooperation
Agreements, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://perma.cc/ZWE7-6P9M.
249. See Brief for the United States of America (Dep’t of Justice) as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Appellant and Vacatur at 3, FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 969
F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-16122) (arguing that an antitrust enforcement
decision against Qualcomm, a domestic company, will shift the United States’
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However, antitrust law plays a particularly important role in
international politics today due to the rise of technology.
Technology has revolutionized foreign intelligence and
espionage.250 Accordingly, countries have grappled for control of
the technology industry, notably China and the United
States,251 initiating “the technology cold war.”252 Both the
United States and China have used antitrust regulation to
further their position in this technology war.253 Therefore,
technological advancement requires that antitrust enforcement
be carefully coordinated with foreign policy.
The executive branch, specifically the president, directs and
controls relations with international entities.254 Thomas
Jefferson described the president as “the only channel of
communication between the United States and foreign
nations.”255 Traditional descriptions of executive power by
political writers have necessarily included foreign affairs

dominance in 5G technologies and harm national security); see also David J.
Gerber, International Competitive Harm and Domestic Antitrust Laws: Forms
of Analysis, 10 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 41, 41 (1989).
250. See Edward Lucas, The Spycraft Revolution, FOREIGN POL’Y (Apr. 27,
2019), https://perma.cc/25BH-7NE8 (“The biggest disruptive force is
technological.”).
251. See Marguerite Reardon, How 5G Got Tied Up in a Trade War
Between Trump and China, CNET (July 15, 2019, 7:30 AM), https://perma.cc
/3GR5-5DLK
[T]he outcome of the 5G race is likely to determine whether the US
will continue to maintain its technological edge and shape
geopolitics for the next couple of decades or if [it will] cede that
control to China, which sees technological dominance as a way to
become a world superpower.
252. Adam Segal, Year in Review 2019: The U.S.-China Tech Cold War
Deepens and Expands, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS.: BLOG (Dec. 18, 2019),
https://perma.cc/QB6W-3SQB.
253. See infra notes 277–299 and accompanying text.
254. Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power
over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 233 (2001). While some scholars argue
that Congress plays a dominant role in foreign affairs, they concede that the
president has significant foreign powers under the Constitution. Id. at 240– 41.
255. A Short History of the Department of State, U.S. DEP’T STATE, OFF.
HISTORIAN, https://perma.cc/6H5V-9C4P.
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powers.256 The Constitution specifically enumerates the
president’s power to make treaties, appoint ambassadors, and
control the army and navy.257 These designations enable the
president to conduct diplomacy with foreign nations.258 The
Supreme Court has affirmed that the president is “the sole
organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations.”259 The secretary of state, the Foreign Service, and the
U.S. Agency for International Development report to the
president and carry out his or her foreign policy.260 Outside of
constitutional grants of power, as a practical matter, the
president is generally privy to information relevant to foreign
affairs on a more up-to-date basis than other governmental
bodies.261 His or her constitutional power and comparative
information advantage both place the president in a position to
direct international relations and safeguard against foreign
threats. Therefore, the president must directly oversee antitrust
policy to carry out his or her constitutional foreign policy duties.
The president has such direct oversight of the DOJ. The
president appoints the attorney general and assistant attorneys

256. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 254, at 234 (“[T]he ordinary
eighteenth-century meaning of executive power . . . included foreign affairs
powers.”).
257. U.S. CONST. art II.
258. See Jonathan Masters, U.S. Foreign Policy Powers: Congress and the
President, COUNCIL FOREIGN RELS., https://perma.cc/CHY2-AL8T (last
updated Mar. 2, 2017) (describing the implied power of conducting diplomacy
with other countries as flowing from the express power to appoint and receive
ambassadors).
259. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320
(1936).
260. The Secretary of State, U.S. DEP’T STATE, https://perma.cc/AGV4Y2Q5.
261. See Brandice Canes-Wrone et al., Toward a Broader Understanding
of Presidential Power: A Reevaluation of the Two Presidencies Thesis, 70 J.
POL. 1, 4 (2008) (arguing that the president can use various policies and tools
to act without congressional endorsement).
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general 262 and retains the power to fire these agents at will.263
The Antitrust Division has a particularly hierarchal structure
wherein the president appoints an assistant attorney general
who oversees the entire Antitrust Division.264 The same cannot
be said for the FTC. The FTC is an independent agency, and
heads of the agency can only be removed by the president for
good cause.265 The president may exert political pressure on the
FTC as an independent agency to take a specific action, but he
is not able to direct the agency in the same way.266 And, since
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
independence of the FTC,267 the president has never fired any
commissioner.268
Under dual antitrust enforcement, the president is thus
handicapped in his or her direction of antitrust policy. The FTC
and DOJ jointly represent the United States in multiple
international antitrust organizations, such as the Internal
Competition Network269 and Competition Committee of the

262. Assistant Attorney General, U.S. DEP’T JUST., ANTITRUST DIV., https://
perma.cc/6EUD-XQBV.
263. That said, the DOJ traditionally operates with a degree of
prosecutorial independence. Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Can the
President Control the Department of Justice?, 70 ALA. L. REV. 1, 38–68 (2018).
264. DOJ ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, supra note 229, at I-3.
265. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 626 (1935)
(concluding that the president’s power to remove a head of the FTC is limited
to the causes enumerated in the Federal Trade Commission Act).
266. For example, in 2011, President Obama released executive orders
requiring agencies to conduct retrospective regulatory reviews. Independent
agencies were not bound to these orders. Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg.
3,821 (Jan. 18, 2011), https://perma.cc/RK4E-TFGD (PDF); Exec. Order No.
13610, 77 Fed. Reg. 28,469 (May 10, 2012), https://perma.cc/VN2H-WDC6
(PDF).
267. See Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 628 (stating that the duties of the
FTC “are performed without executive leave and, in the contemplation of the
statute, must be free from executive control”).
268. See Commissioners, Chairwomen and Chairmen of the Federal Trade
Commission, FED. TRADE COMM’N (2018), https://perma.cc/32XV-5TDT (listing
each commissioner and their term of service and stating that commissioners
serve a seven-year term unless they resign early).
269. DOJ ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, supra note 229, at VII-34.
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Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.270
The FTC has the power to enforce its antitrust judgments
abroad,271 which further hinders the president’s ability to form
cohesive international policies. Further, the FTC does not
distinguish between its international and domestic activities.272
After the agency determines its enforcement policies, it
“enforces them to the fullest extent of its jurisdictional
authority, whether foreign or domestic.”273 This could give rise
to antitrust decisions that cut against the nation’s best interest.
Antitrust policy is a tool in the toolbox when it comes to
navigating a complex global economy and political landscape. It
should be used in the context of the country’s overall
international policies and goals.
FTC v. Qualcomm reveals how international relations and
national security are intertwined with antitrust policy.274
Opposing the district court’s decision in the case successfully
brought by the FTC, the DOJ argued that the antitrust
enforcement action harmed Qualcomm’s ability to compete and
so posed a serious national security threat.275 As support, the
agency cited to statements by the Departments of Defense and
Energy.276 Through various departments, the executive branch

270. Id.
271. See, e.g., Branch v. FTC, 141 F.2d 31, 35 (7th Cir. 1944) (holding that
the FTC had the power to order Branch to cease and desist in a diploma mill
in Latin America).
272. See Jesse R. Ruhl, Comment, The International Law Limits to the
FTC’s International Activity: Does the Law of Nations Keep the FTC at Home?,
7 PA. ST. INT’L L. REV. 319, 325 (1989) (“[T]he FTC does not have a different
strategy for pursuing domestic as opposed to international activities.”).
273. Id.
274. 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020).
275. See Brief for the United States of America (Dep’t of Justice) as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Appellant and Vacatur at 12, FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 969
F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-16122) (describing Qualcomm as a supplier of
“mission-critical” products and services to the United States).
276. See Declaration of Department of Energy Chief Information Officer
Max Everett, FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020) (No.
19-16122); Declaration of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment Ellen M. Lord, FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir.
2020) (No. 19-16122).
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has taken strong steps to protect Qualcomm amidst the
technology cold war between the United States and China. This
suit threatened to do the opposite.
Qualcomm is the world’s largest manufacturer of
smartphone chips.277 It is also the only American company that
manufactures such chips, with China-backed Huawei as one of
its biggest competitors.278 These two companies are at the heart
of a battle between the United States and China for
technological dominance.279 Qualcomm and Huawei are central
to the development of 5G, the new standard network for mobile
devices.280 The outcome of the 5G race will determine whether
the U.S. will continue to dominate the technology industry, or if
it will “cede that control to China, which sees technological
dominance as a way to become a world superpower.”281 National
security experts worry that if Huawei dominates the 5G market,
it could use its networks for espionage or shut down critical
communications.282 Many lawmakers have also expressed

277. See Jene Park, Samsung Became the Third Largest Smartphone
Application Processor Vendor Globally in 2019, COUNTERPOINT (Apr. 13, 2020),
https://perma.cc/Q74S-BSDL (showing that Qualcomm had 33.4 percent of the
global smartphone application processor market share in 2019, the most of
any company).
278. See Brian Fung, Qualcomm Is Now Alone at Top of 5G Chip Market,
LEDGER (Apr. 18, 2019, 4:34 PM), https://perma.cc/Z3LG-RBJC (naming
Qualcomm’s biggest competitors as Huawei and Samsung); Rob Enderle,
Qualcomm vs. Huawei: Is This a Battle Between Companies or Countries?, IT
BUS. EDGE (Mar. 9, 2019), https://perma.cc/9ELC-AMRY.
279. See The Threat of a U.S.-China “Tech Cold War”, AXIOS (Nov. 18,
2019), https://perma.cc/JUR2-Q2XX (describing a tech cold war between the
U.S. and China as “the greatest threat to globalization since the end of World
War II”).
280. See Ethan Epstein, The Little-Known Court Case That Could Damage
U.S. National Security, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2019), https://perma.cc/6248DD7X (stating that 5G networks will allow for autonomous vehicles,
robo-surgeries, smart cities, and drone flying); Daniel Shane & Sherisse Pham,
Why the US Killed Broadcom’s Giant Bid for Qualcomm, CNN (Mar. 13, 2018,
7:31 AM), https://perma.cc/K854-JQ4J.
281. Reardon, supra note 251.
282. Id.
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concern with China’s rise in technology, fearing a Chinese
surveillance state.283
In addressing these threats, President Trump blocked an
attempted acquisition of Qualcomm by Broadcom in 2018.284
The president expressed concern that Broadcom, a Singaporean
company, would cut off Qualcomm’s R&D and enable Huawei to
dominate the marketplace.285 The transaction was blocked
through the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States (CFIUS), a committee comprised of executive branch
officers such as the secretaries of the Treasury, Justice,
Homeland Security, Commerce, and Defense—all directly
responsible to the president.286 CFIUS reviews economic
transactions by foreign entities and advises the president, who
can block transactions that threaten national security.287
CFIUS reviews have increased steadily in the last decade and
Chinese transactions have accounted for the majority of the
investigations.288
Outside of CFIUS, the executive branch imposed
restrictions on Huawei and affiliated companies. In 2019, the
U.S. Commerce Department placed Huawei on a trade blacklist
based on national security concerns.289 In announcing the
action, the secretary of commerce cited a presidential directive
ordering the department to be vigilant in protecting national

283. Nitasha Tiku, Big Tech: Breaking Us Up Will Only Help China, WIRED
(May 23, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://perma.cc/HL4J-QPHC.
284. Kate O’Keeffe, Trump Orders Broadcom to Cease Attempt to Buy
Qualcomm, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 13, 2018, 12:33 PM), https://perma.cc/656ZPWX8.
285. Id. (describing the attempted acquisition as a national security risk).
286. CFIUS Overview, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, https://perma.cc/L3UTG64G.
287. CONG. RSCH. SERV., THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 1 (Dec. 16, 2019), https://perma.cc/8SBU-V9AE (PDF).
288. See COMM. ON FOREIGN INV. U.S., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 18,
https://perma.cc/36NH-MS5T (PDF) (stating that Chinese investors received
the most notices from 2015 to 2017).
289. Department of Commerce Announces the Addition of Huawei
Technologies Co. Ltd. to the Entity List, U.S. DEP’T COMMERCE (2019) https://
perma.cc/QBA2-7JLA.
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security activities.290 In 2020, the DOJ indicted Huawei for
intellectual property theft and conspiring to steal trade
secrets.291 The international importance of the U.S. actions is
underscored by its joining a movement of democracies to isolate
Huawei and promote other companies as 5G providers.292
China has also taken counteractions against U.S.
technology, making any mechanism the United States has in
this struggle more important. In 2018, Chinese antitrust
regulators blocked Qualcomm from acquiring rival chipmaker
NXP.293 The Trump administration had lobbied the Chinese
government to approve the deal, which would have allowed
Qualcomm to expand into new market areas.294 In 2019, the
Chinese government ordered Chinese public institutions to
replace foreign software and computer equipment with domestic
suppliers within a few years.295 In sum, both China and the U.S.
have leveraged antitrust regulation to give domestic companies
a strategic international competitive advantage. And this
290. See id. (explaining that a placement on the Entity List “will prevent
American technology from being used by foreign owned entities” in a
potentially threatening way).
291. Chinese Telecommunications Conglomerate Huawei and Subsidiaries
Charged in Racketeering Conspiracy and Conspiracy to Steal Trade Secrets,
U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Feb. 13, 2020), https://perma.cc/B8LX-6QQH.
292. See Srijan Shukla, UK Wants 5G Alliance of 10 Countries, Including
India, to Avoid Reliance on Chinese Huawei, PRINT (May 29, 2020, 4:34 PM),
https://perma.cc/9WWW-69W4 (noting that the United Kingdom is pursuing
an alliance of ten democratic countries, including the United States, that
would seek to create an alternative pool of 5G technology and equipment).
293. Liana B. Baker & Greg Roumeliotis, Qualcomm Says China Comment
Will Not Revive NXP Deal, REUTERS (Dec. 3, 2018, 12:21 AM), https://perma.cc
/53YK-V9LK; Sherisse Pham, China Kills Qualcomm’s $44 Billion Deal for
NXP, CNN (July 26, 2018, 7:07 AM), https://perma.cc/C2LG-NVNY (stating
that Qualcomm confirmed that it was “terminating its proposed takeover of
Dutch counterpart NXP . . . after China failed to grant it regulatory
approval”).
294. See Matt Rosoff, Qualcomm Reportedly Says It Sees No Prospect for
NXP Deal Despite US-China Trade Truce, CNBC (Dec. 3, 2018, 12:37 AM),
https://perma.cc/T88T-CMFZ (noting actions taken by the White House to
appease China in hopes of reviving the Qualcomm deal).
295. REBECCA FANNIN, STAKES RISE IN U.S.-CHINA TECH COLD WAR WITH
LATEST BLOCK 1–2 (2019), https://perma.cc/S8RC-JYE9 (PDF) (describing the
split in software and computer equipment as a “splinternet”).
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technology war is only one part of a broader strained trade
relationship between the United States and China.296 The White
House has reported that China’s market-distorting policies and
economic aggression pose a threat to the global economy.297 A
2018 report pointed to state-sponsored IP theft through cyber
espionage and forced technology transfer regulations.298 Since
2018, the two countries have had to negotiate various tariffs and
trade agreements.299
Therefore, it is highly anomalous that the FTC has
exercised its prosecutorial discretion to bring an antitrust action
against Qualcomm that will—in coordination with China’s
actions—directly benefit Huawei and aid China in its foreign
policy goals, when the president and his advisors are actively
pursuing exactly the opposite goal. The problem created by the
struggle for technological dominance and antitrust’s role in it
goes beyond this single case, important as it is. As of 2018,
China had nine of the world’s top twenty technology
companies.300 Big Tech executives have argued that breaking up
Big Tech under antitrust law will only help Chinese companies
dominate the industry.301 Effectively, they promote a “national
296. See Rick Gladstone, How the Cold War Between China and U.S. Is
Intensifying, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2020), https://perma.cc/KW2C-UG9B (last
updated July 24, 2020) (“In defense, trade, technology, media and diplomacy,
among other areas, the rancor between the Trump administration and China’s
ruling Communist Party is worsening.”).
297. WHITE HOUSE OFF. TRADE AND MFG. POL’Y, HOW CHINA’S ECONOMIC
AGGRESSION THREATENS THE TECHNOLOGIES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF
THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD 1 (2018), https://perma.cc/KY4U-HS9M
(PDF).
298. Id. at 2–5.
299. United States and China Reach Phase One Trade Agreement, OFF.
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Dec. 13, 2019), https://perma.cc/5WJL-VWF8.
300. See Stephen Armstrong, Splitting Up Facebook and Google Would
Be Great for China, WIRED (Oct. 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/UD7X-THXB
(listing the nine companies, ranked by market valuation, located in China
and their respective roles in the tech sphere).
301. See id. (noting that if the big American companies get broken up,
there is a fear that no equally formidable Western player will be left to defend
against Chinese companies); Tiku, supra note 283 (stating that Facebook’s
chief operating officer and the CEO of Google have both expressed the idea
that breaking up Big Tech will only serve China).
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champion” view: the nation needs powerful, dominant
companies lest a foreign company take the helm.302 Some
scholars have criticized national champion policies, stating that
any short-term advantages are outweighed by the harm to
national innovation.303 Regardless, the battle over the future of
technology shows how antitrust regulation plays a key role in a
struggle for technological, economic, and political power—and
that the U.S. needs a single, president-coordinated agency to
guide the process.
The problem of integrating antitrust with the rest of foreign
policy is not unique to China or President Trump. President
Barack Obama, like President Trump, accused the EU of
pursuing antitrust or regulatory actions against Big Tech in
order to help their own tech companies compete.304 Some
countries in the EU are using state authority to promote
national champions to combat U.S. tech dominance.305 For
instance, France and Germany have spent significant
government resources in attempts to create a European rival to
U.S, cloud computing companies.306 France has additionally
302. Cf. Rana Foroohar, National Champions Are Not the Way to Compete
with China, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2019), https://perma.cc/8KMX-AB68
(defining “national champions” as “large companies protected and supported
by the state”).
303. See Daniel Kishi, Against Bigness? Begin by Breaking Up Big Tech,
AM. CONSERVATIVE (Nov. 28, 2018, 12:01 AM), https://perma.cc/9LLH-BAJG
(interviewing Tim Wu, the author of THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE
NEW GILDED AGE, who argues a national champion policy does not work). Wu
notes that breaking up IBM and AT&T didn’t allow Japan to take over in the
1970s and 1980s and in fact led to supremacy in American tech. Id.
304. See Gaines, supra note 16 (“President Obama said the European
companies were sore losers and were using their governments to gain footing
against American rivals.”); Toman, supra note 16 (“US President Donald
Trump attacked the European Union for taking action against US tech
companies such as Google and Facebook over antitrust issues.”).
305. See Adam Satariano & Monika Pronczuk, Europe, Overrun by Foreign
Tech Giants, Wants to Grow Its Own, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2020), https://
perma.cc/J8T8-U65C (“[European Union] [o]fficials laid out some broad ideas
that suggest the authorities will seek to nurture homegrown businesses by
taking on the giants from overseas . . . .”).
306. See Mark Scott, What’s Driving Europe’s New Aggressive Stance on
Tech, POLITICO (Oct. 29, 2019, 4:01 PM), https://perma.cc/Y7V7-RZV3 (“The
countries’ joint efforts to create a European rival to Google, known as Quaero,
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levied a tax on digital giants, commonly dubbed “GAFA,”
because it will primarily affect American tech companies
Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon.307 U.S. antitrust
regulators must also counter these threats to the American
economy and technological dominance when exercising
prosecutorial discretion over enforcement actions in the
technological arena.
The competition for technological dominance is an enduring
fact of our age. Moreover, technology is encompassing more and
more important industries, encapsulated in the saying that
“software is eating the world.”308 It is thus more important today
for the nation’s antitrust policy to be aligned with other foreign
policy actions taken by the executive branch.309 The FTC should
not be able to bring antitrust actions when they can cut against
the various other international efforts taken by the country.
B.

Consolidating Antitrust Enforcement under the DOJ
Allows the FTC to Focus on Privacy

Eliminating its jurisdiction over antitrust will also give the
FTC the resources and focus to address issues of privacy.
Privacy law has grown in prominence along with the rise of
digital technology.310 While most Western countries have
were quietly scrapped in 2013 after receiving millions of euros in government
grants with little, if any, impact on the search giant’s dominance.”).
307. Christina Okello, France to Levy Digital Tax Despite US Decision to
Walk Out of Talks, RFI (June 18, 2020, 4:20 PM), https://perma.cc/67KZH3K2.
308. Marc Andreessen, Why Software Is Eating the World, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 20, 2011), https://perma.cc/6ZEW-W3NE. Thus, it would not be
foresighted to simply make the DOJ responsible for industries driven by
current technology. Moreover, dividing antitrust enforcement responsibilities
along these lines would lead to the kind of turf fight between the FTC and the
DOJ we have seen before—this time over what constitutes an industry with
foreign policy effects.
309. See 2 SPENCER WEBER WALLER & ANDRE FIEBIG, ANTITRUST &
AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD § 23.22 (4th ed. 2020) (“Coordination of antitrust
policy . . . is only one aspect of far larger problems in coordinating foreign
policy with defense and domestic interests.”).
310. See Cameron F. Kerry, Why Protecting Privacy Is a Losing Game
Today—and How to Change the Game, BROOKINGS INST. (July 12, 2018),
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comprehensive privacy protections, the U.S. has taken a
piecemeal approach, with various sector-specific and
state-specific laws.311 These uneven regulations have been
criticized for causing confusion for businesses and failing to
adequately protect consumers.312 In fact, 79 percent of
Americans are concerned about the way their data is being used
by companies and most feel that they have little to no control
over how their personal data is used.313
First, eliminating FTC antitrust jurisdiction would free up
resources, enabling the agency to dedicate more of its funding,
personnel, and time to privacy issues.314 Second, it would
streamline the FTC’s mission, which is currently divided
between dueling goals of consumer protection and antitrust.315
Agencies tend to perform better when they have a cohesive
mission.316 Removing the agency’s antitrust duties would
resolve this problem. Narrowing the focus of the FTC’s
responsibilities would be a significant step in the right direction
for the agency and the future of privacy law.

https://perma.cc/JH7W-PZWG (noting the rapid increase in technological
advances and the concurrent “increasing spread of state legislation” on privacy
concerns that may push the adoption of a “single set of federal rules”).
311. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA)); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/15 (West 2020)
(Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (West
2020) (California Consumer Privacy Act).
312. See Nuala O’Connor, Reforming the U.S. Approach to Data Protection
and Privacy, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://perma.cc
/T4ZU-FLHR (“[C]ompanies need clearer rules, and individuals need to be able
to incentivize companies to secure data.”).
313. Brooke Auxier et al., Americans and Privacy: Concerned, Confused
and Feeling Lack of Control over Their Personal Information, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Nov. 15, 2019), https://perma.cc/C9WQ-L7GT.
314. David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Implementing Privacy Policy:
Who Should Do What?, 29 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1117,
1144 (2019).
315. See id. (“[A]n agency responsible for antitrust, consumer protection,
and privacy is likely to find itself making tradeoffs as it sets priorities for how
to use its resources.”).
316. See id. (“An agency focused solely on privacy will make privacy policy
its single concern.”); see also infra notes 371–379 and accompanying text.
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The FTC needs more resources to adequately address the
nation’s growing privacy concerns.317 Currently, the FTC
oversees
both
consumer
protection—encompassing
privacy—and antitrust,318 making the FTC the chief federal
agency on privacy policy and enforcement319 and the nation’s de
facto privacy agency.320 The agency has long-standing
experience in enforcing privacy statutes321 and also has special
privacy assets, such as an internet lab capable of high-quality
tech forensics to track invasions of privacy.322 The FTC,
however, has failed to keep pace with the massive growth of
privacy concerns—a phenomenon also driven by modern
technology.323 Very few Americans feel confident in the privacy
of their information in the digital age.324 According to a 2019
study, over 80 percent of Americans feel that they have little to
no control over the data collected on them by companies and the
government.325 To adequately address privacy concerns, the

317. See Terrell McSweeny, FTC 2.0: Keeping Pace with Online Platforms,
32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1027, 1049 (2017) (stating that the FTC needs
additional resources and expanded enforcement mechanisms concerning its
privacy work).
318. Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 314, at 1131.
319. Protecting Consumer Privacy and Security, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://
perma.cc/HQ4V-4W2Q.
320. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common
Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 600 (2014).
321. See Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 314, at 1142 (“Of all U.S. privacy
implementation institutions, the FTC has unequaled capacity in the form of
expert case handling and policy teams and physical resources . . . .” ).
322. See id. (noting that the FTC has spent the last decade developing an
“internet laboratory to do high-quality forensic work, and the hiring of
technology experts to assist in that effort”).
323. See, e.g., Nicholas Confessore & Cecilia Kang, Facebook Data
Scandals Stoke Criticism That a Privacy Watchdog Too Rarely Bites, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 30, 2018), https://perma.cc/6RR2-NRUM (describing concerns
about the FTC’s ability to adequately address privacy concerns associated with
technological advances).
324. See Mary Madden & Lee Rainie, Americans’ Attitudes About Privacy,
Security and Surveillance, PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 20, 2015), https://perma.cc
/L7BG-232E (“Americans have little confidence that their data will remain
private and secure.”).
325. Auxier et al., supra note 313.
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FTC needs more resources.326 The agency has been explicit that
it needs more manpower to police tech companies.327 In
requesting increased funding from Congress, FTC Director
Joseph Simons said the money would allow the agency to hire
additional staff and bring more privacy cases.328 A former
director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, which
houses the privacy unit, has called the FTC “woefully
understaffed.”329
As of the spring of 2019, the FTC had only forty employees
dedicated to privacy and data security, compared to 500 and 110
employees at comparable agencies in the U.K. and Ireland,
respectively.330 Without more lawyers, investigators, and
technologists, the FTC will be forced to conduct privacy
investigations less thoroughly, and in some cases, forgo them
altogether.331 Currently, the FTC’s resources are spread thin
across multiple missions, to the detriment of its privacy efforts.
Removing the agency’s antitrust responsibilities would
reallocate resources from the antitrust department to its
privacy unit and other areas of consumer protection.332 Further,
it would free up the scarce time of the commissioners to oversee
this essential effort.333
This reallocation of resources is especially timely because
the FTC’s privacy responsibilities are expected to grow in the
326. See Shaun G. Jamison, Creating a National Data Privacy Law for the
United States, 10 CYBARIS INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 33 (2019).
327. See Harper Neidig, FTC Says It Only Has 40 Employees Overseeing
Privacy and Data Security, HILL (Apr. 3, 2019, 11:01 AM), https://perma.cc
/6MPL-LX4W.
328. Id.
329. Jessica Rich, Give the F.T.C. Some Teeth to Guard Our Privacy, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 12, 2019), https://perma.cc/F4FK-L46P.
330. See Neidig, supra note 327.
331. See id.
332. See Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 314, at 1145 (“[T]he long-term
result of making the FTC the nation’s top privacy cop may transform the
agency into a consumer protection/privacy regulator, rather than a consumer
protection/antitrust regulator.”).
333. This restructuring has long been called for, even in the 1980s,
scholars proposed releasing the FTC from its antitrust duties so that the
agency could concentrate on consumerism. Handler, supra note 187, at 1320.
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future. The FTC is already on its way to becoming a consumer
protection agency primarily focused on privacy.334 In its 2019
budget request to Congress, over half of the agency’s budget was
allocated to privacy.335 In addition, lawmakers on both sides of
the political spectrum have proposed federal privacy
legislation.336 Such legislation would expand the FTC’s
jurisdiction, empower it to bring more privacy actions, and
increase the demands on its privacy resources.337 Right now, the
U.S. is one of the only Western countries that does not have a
comprehensive federal privacy law.338 Public pressure is great
from both industry and scholars to change that, which would
lead to increased privacy action at the federal level.339 Moving
the FTC’s antitrust duties to the DOJ would cleanly complete a
readjusting of priorities that is already happening organically.
Removing its authority over competition law would also
provide the FTC with organizational clarity. Currently, the
agency serves dual missions of antitrust and consumer
protection. Originally, the FTC only had antitrust jurisdiction:
the FTC Act banned “unfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce.”340 In 1931, the Supreme Court held that

334.
335.

Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 314, at 1145.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2019 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
JUSTIFICATION 198 (2018), https://perma.cc/E3T3-VSCA (PDF).
336. See Emily Birnbaum, GOP Senator Introduces Privacy Legislation
After Bipartisan Talks Break Down, HILL (Mar. 12, 2020, 6:30 AM), https://
perma.cc/F8LC-RY4H (stating that the legislative proposals show some
“substantive common ground” between lawmakers on both sides of the aisle).
337. Neidig, supra note 327.
338. See Birnbaum, supra note 336 (“[T]he U.S. is one of the only countries
in the Western world without a comprehensive law providing safeguards
around how corporations collect personal information on their users.”).
339. See Dina Temple-Raston, Why the Tech Industry Wants Federal
Control over Data Privacy Laws, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 8, 2018, 5:00 AM),
https://perma.cc/AH8G-YM6F (indicating that the tech industry supports
federal legislation that would preempt potentially restrictive state legislation);
Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 905 (2009)
(considering arguments for and against a federal omnibus law that would fill
the gaps in the patchwork of state privacy law).
340. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)–(2).
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this did not include consumer protection.341 In 1938, Congress
passed the Wheeler-Lea Act,342 which amended the FTC Act to
cover “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”343 This paved the
way for the FTC’s modern consumer protection mission.344 Since
then, the agency has had to pursue goals that are sometimes in
conflict.
Consumer protection laws prevent companies from
misleading or cheating customers. Viewed broadly, consumer
protection encompasses a paternalistic social goal of protecting
consumers from themselves.345 Consumers may not wish to be
educated on manipulative practices or dangerous products, but
consumer protection laws aim to protect consumers despite any
preference for ignorance. The FTC enforces numerous consumer
protection statutes that govern bankruptcy abuse, scholarship
fraud, tobacco education, and credit card accountability, among
other things.346
The FTC approaches privacy as a consumer protection
issue.347 Accordingly, the FTC promotes privacy interests
through its Bureau of Consumer Protection.348 At first, the
agency pursued a limited deception-based approach to privacy
by targeting companies that did not comply with their own

341. See FTC v. Raladam, 283 U.S. 643, 648–49 (1931) (holding that
“unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce” does not include
consumer protection).
342. Ch. 49 § 2, 52 Stat. 111 (1938).
343. Lesley Fair, FTC Milestones: Weighing in on Weight Loss Cases, FED.
TRADE COMM’N (Dec. 4, 2014, 11:25 AM), https://perma.cc/GW9W-T29A.
344. See id. (“Wheeler-Lea put the focus on consumer injury . . . .”).
345. See id. (discussing the application of the FTC’s consumer protection
mission to a dangerous and deceptively advertised weight loss product).
346. Statutes Enforced or Administered by the Commission, FED. TRADE
COMM’N, https://perma.cc/6YQ8-ZG72.
347. Maureen K. Ohlhausen & Alexander P. Okuliar, Competition,
Consumer Protection, and the Right [Approach] to Privacy, 80 ANTITRUST L.J.
121, 146 (2015).
348. See Division of Privacy and Identity Protection, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
https://perma.cc/Y55L-U62Y (listing the responsibilities of the Division of
Privacy and Identity Protection and noting that it operates within the Bureau
of Consumer Protection).
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privacy policies.349 Since then, the FTC has broadened its
approach to a harms-based inquiry against unfair handling of
consumer data.350 The harms are generally linked to the rise of
digital technology. For instance, consumers cannot effectively
protect themselves in our dynamic, information-intense
environment.351 Some argue that digital products have led to
externalities such as reduced offline interaction, addiction by
design, and environmental harm in the form of electronic
garbage and energy consumption.352 Competition will result in
the amount of privacy demanded by the market, which may not
account for externalities and inaccurately reflect society’s
desires compared to the amount of privacy that people would
collectively choose through legislation.353
In contrast to consumer protection law, antitrust law aims
to preserve “free and unfettered competition.”354 The foundation
of antitrust law is now understood to be protecting consumer
welfare that flows from economic efficiency.355 Antitrust
promotes the free market by outlawing monopolization and

349. See Ohlhausen & Okuliar, supra note 347, at 148–49 (“Early online
enforcement actions targeted companies that failed to comply with promises
in their privacy policies about how they collected and used data.”).
350. See id. at 149 (“In the early 2000s, the Commission changed tack to
focus more explicitly on specific harms to consumers in connection with
privacy.”).
351. See Derek Ireland & Michael Jenkin, Embedding Consumer
Protection in Competition Policy, POL’Y OPTIONS (June 18, 2018), https://
perma.cc/QU3H-3XSA (“Consumers are very vulnerable to manipulation by
sophisticated marketers and sellers when they make their purchasing
decisions and are often locked into poor decisions by long-term contracts that
are one-sided and unfair, with poor access to redress.”).
352. See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog & Neil Richards, Privacy’s Constitutional
Moment and the Limits of Data Protection, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1687, 1725–26
(2020) (examining the negative consequences of “industry’s appetite for data”).
353. MAURICE STUCKE & ALLEN GRUNES, BIG DATA AND COMPETITION
POLICY 7 (2016).
354. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–38.
355. See Avishalom Tor, Should Antitrust Survive Behavioral Economics?,
CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. 1–2 (2019), https://perma.cc/8B8L-3YMQ (PDF)
(summarizing the tenets of the neoclassical market model, which provides the
economic foundation of antitrust law).
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unreasonable restraints of trade.356 Rather than the social goals
of privacy and protection from deception promoted by consumer
protection, antitrust pursues economic efficiency.357
Consumer protection and free competition can work against
each other. Consumer protection regulation has been
empirically proven to introduce barriers to entry, especially for
small companies.358 Environmental, safety, and health
regulations protect consumers while inhibiting the free
market.359 Consider a specific example of the tension between
consumer protection and competition. The Fair Credit
Reporting Act360 provides an important service to consumers by
protecting the fairness, accuracy, and privacy of personal
information kept by credit reporting agencies.361 At the same
time, these protections introduce high compliance costs that
have limited entry in the credit reporting industry.362 The four
356. See id.
357. See Steven C. Salop, Question: What Is the Real and Proper Antitrust
Welfare Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 336, 336–37 (2010) (discussing the appropriate economic
standard); Joe Kennedy, Why the Consumer Welfare Standard Should Remain
the Bedrock of Antitrust Policy, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. 1–2 (2018),
https://perma.cc/FX2J-R6ZQ (PDF) (“The consumer welfare standard
generally states that overall consumer welfare and economic efficiency should
be the main criterion regulators look to when evaluating a merger or alleged
anticompetitive behavior.”).
358. See James Bailey & Diana Thomas, Regulating Away Competition 2
(Sept. 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://perma.cc/LY73-WFRF
[We ran] fixed effects regressions to show that more-regulated
industries experienced fewer new firm births and slower
employment growth in the period 1998 to 2011. Large firms may
even successfully lobby government officials to increase regulations
to raise their smaller rivals’ costs. We also find that regulations
inhibit employment growth in small firms more than in large firms.
359. See KATALIN JUDIT CSERES, COMPETITION LAW AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION 1 (2005) (“Health, safety and environmental issues of consumer
protection can lead to the withdrawal of products or to the regulation of
markets limiting entry and innovation and eventually lead to higher prices.”).
360. 15 U.S.C. § 1681.
361. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, A SUMMARY OF YOUR RIGHTS UNDER
THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT 1, https://perma.cc/ZT9U-SSDA (PDF).
362. See ALEX MARTHEWS & CATHERINE TUCKER, PRIVACY POLICY AND
COMPETITION 12 (2019), https://perma.cc/V55F-3JZH (PDF) (discussing the
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incumbents that dominate the market were established before
the Act was passed.363
Safeguarding privacy as an aspect of consumer protection
provides similar examples of tensions with promoting
competition. In the U.S., the Children’s Online Privacy
Protection Rule (COPPA) establishes strict requirements on
websites that target children.364 These limitations guard the
privacy of children but have also led to less innovation in
children’s websites and apps in the country. Many apps targeted
at children are developed in countries that have weaker privacy
protections for children, such as Ukraine.365 The passage of
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),366 a sweeping
privacy legislation in Europe, led to increased control by
consumers over their personal data.367 Simultaneously, it
decreased competition among technology vendors and shrank
overall business.368 The anticompetitive effects are
unsurprising, given that the average cost of compliance with the
regulation was £1.67 million.369 Additionally, privacy regulation
difficulty smaller entrants have experienced in competing in the credit
reporting industry).
363. See id. (listing Equifax, Experian, Innovis, and TransUnion as the
four large credit reporting agencies that have seen little competitive entry in
decades).
364. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312.1–.13
(2020).
365. See MARTHEWS & TUCKER, supra note 362, at 16 (noting that countries
like Ukraine allow developers to gather more detailed data on young users
than the United States permits).
366. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to
the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and
Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1.
367. See EU Data Protection Rules, EUR. COMM’N, https://perma.cc/3FM2E4E9 (“Stronger rules on data protection mean people have more control over
their personal data and businesses benefit from a level playing field.”).
368. See Allison Schiff, Privacy Regs like GDPR Hurt Competition in the
Short Term, Study Finds, AD EXCHANGER (Oct. 31, 2019, 8:16 AM), https://
perma.cc/9XX4-V4B6 (discussing the negative consequences of the GDPR).
369. See Marthews & Tucker, supra note 362, at 9. (“The average cost of
compliance was £1.67 million. For firms between 100 and 249 employees, the
average investment in GDPR compliance was £947,000, and the average

ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT

371

in the U.S. focuses on regulating interfirm data transfers over
intrafirm uses, privileging large tech companies that are able to
commercialize user data on their own.370 This may have the
effect of further entrenching monopolists, contrary to the goals
of antitrust. This conflict between consumer protection,
including the protection of privacy, and antitrust poses a
problem of incompatible missions for the FTC.
When Congress recognized conflicting goals in other
agencies, it divided or reorganized them so that agencies are not
tasked with contradictory missions. For instance, the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) struggled to balance its goals of
promoting commercial aviation and promoting aviation
safety.371 Changes that would ensure safety were often
abandoned because they were outweighed by financial costs that
would harm the aviation business.372 After a high-profile plane
crash in 1996, Congress removed the FAA’s mission in
promoting aviation, and from then on the agency was able to
focus solely on safety.373 The Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) also experienced tensions from its dual mission.
The agency dealt with a “mission overload and conflict” of
enforcing immigration while also providing immigration
services.374 Immigration enforcement keeps people out, while
compliance investment of firms with more than 1,000 employees was £2.3
million.”).
370. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.120 (West 2020) (detailing rights
consumers have when a business sells consumer personal information to third
parties).
371. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., HISTORY OF AVIATION SAFETY OVERSIGHT IN
THE UNITED STATES 18 (2008), https://perma.cc/5Y4E-2QRM (PDF) (detailing
the FAA’s responses to airline accidents).
372. Lea Ann Carlisle, The FAA v. the NTSB: Now That Congress Has
Addressed the Federal Aviation Administration’s Dual Mandate, Has the FAA
Begun Living Up to Its Amended Purpose of Making Air Travel Safer, or Is the
National Transportation Safety Board Still Doing Its Job Alone, 66 J. AIR L. &
COM. 741, 746–47 (2001).
373. See id. at 741.
374. Restructuring the INS—How the Agency’s Dysfunctional Structure
Impedes the Performance of Its Dual Mission: Hearing before the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 20 (2002) [hereinafter Restructuring the INS]
(statement of Ms. Susan Martin, Director, Institute for the Study of
International Migration, Georgetown University).
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immigration services admits entrants.375 A study concluded that
the incompatible missions led to “competition for resources,”
“lack of coordination and cooperation,” and “confusion regarding
mission and responsibilities.”376 The INS itself proposed a
restructuring to separate its conflicting goals into two separate
agencies.377 Congress acted and created the U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services (USCIS) to handle immigration
services378 and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agencies
to handle investigative and enforcement actions.379 Given the
proven problems with conflicting mandates, Congress should
reorganize the FTC as it has done in the past for the FAA and
INS.
FTC commissioners themselves have recognized that there
is a tension between its mandates to pursue competition and
privacy. FTC Commissioner Christine S. Wilson has expressed
that “both information asymmetries and the presence of
externalities lead to inefficient outcomes with regard to privacy
and data security.”380 While she has “great faith in markets,”
she believes federal privacy and data security legislation is
needed.381 FTC Commissioner Noah Joshua Phillips notes that
375. Compare DORIS MEISSNER ET AL., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES: THE RISE OF A FORMIDABLE MACHINERY 1–2 (2013), https://
perma.cc/72RG-5ZQ7 (PDF) (immigration enforcement), with What We Do,
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://perma.cc/YAV7-WHB6 (last
updated Feb. 27, 2020) (immigration services).
376. Restructuring the INS, supra note 374, at 21.
377. See id. (“Under the Commission’s proposal, the responsibility for
immigration enforcement would remain with the Justice Department in a new
Bureau for Immigration Enforcement. The responsibility for immigration
services, now dispersed among the State, Justice and Labor Departments,
would be consolidated into a new office for Citizenship, Immigration, and
Refugee Admissions.”).
378. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 411, 116 Stat.
2135, 2195–96.
379. Id. § 411, 116 Stat. at 2178–79.
380. Christine S. Wilson, Comm’r, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, A Defining
Moment for Privacy: The Time is Ripe for Federal Privacy Legislation,
Remarks at the Future of Privacy Forum 3 (Feb. 6, 2020), https://perma.cc
/6ULG-WM6D.
381. Id.
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such legislation has substantial trade-offs on competition,
growth, and innovation that must be recognized.382 Joe Simons,
chairman of the FTC, has made similar statements, recognizing
that privacy protections can have the effect of reducing
competition and entrenching large tech platforms.383
Commissioner Phillips has addressed the issue most directly,
remarking that:
The tension between competition and privacy means that,
rather than strengthening either, pushing competition and
privacy law to converge threatens to confuse (and thus
weaken) the enforcement of each. He who serves two masters
serves none, they say. Where the interests of both align,
perhaps we are less concerned. But competition and privacy
are often at odds. Are law enforcers forced to make a choice
that cannot be made? And how could courts review such
decisions?384

Creating a single antitrust agency in the DOJ resolves the
conflict between two missions that multiple commissioners have
acknowledged. Government reorganization is easier here than
in these previous examples because an experienced agency is at
the ready to undertake its responsibilities under competition
law. Housing antitrust under the DOJ allows the FTC to pursue
consumer protection and privacy goals without compromising
effective antitrust enforcement.385

382. Noah Joshua Phillips, Comm’r, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at
Antonin Scalia Law School’s Program on Economic and Privacy Program: Is
EU Privacy Regulation Being Exported to the US? 13 (Dec. 3, 2019), https://
perma.cc/JFT9-CRG9 (PDF).
383. Oversight of the Federal Trade Commission: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Digit. Com. & Consumer Protect. of the H. Comm. on Energy &
Com., 115th Cong. 59–60 (2018) (statement of Joseph Simons, Chairman, Fed.
Trade Comm’n).
384. Noah Joshua Phillips, Comm’r, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Should We
Block This Merger? Some Thoughts on Converging Antitrust and Privacy,
Prepared Remarks for the Mentor Group Paris Forum 15 (Jan. 30, 2020),
https://perma.cc/RYQ8-9QMZ.
385. Removing the FTC’s jurisdiction over antitrust law would not
preclude the agency from considering impacts on competition in its consumer
protection decisions.
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Focusing the FTC on privacy will also bring the United
States into line with much of the rest of the world. In the 1980s,
countries such as Sweden, West Germany, and France already
had years of experience with data protection agencies.386 Since
then, the number of stand-alone data protection agencies
around the globe has only grown. The United Kingdom upholds
information rights through its Information Commissioner’s
Office,387 Germany through its Federal Commissioner for Data
Protection and Freedom of Information,388 Tunisia through its
National Authority for Protection of Personal Data,389 Ghana
through its Data Protection Commission,390 Japan through its
Personal Information Protection Commission,391 Canada
through its Office of the Privacy Commissioner,392 Argentina
through its National Directorate for Personal Data
Protection,393 and Costa Rica through its Agency for the
Protection of Individual’s Data.394
It is true that the FTC would not be a pure data protection
agency, but rather a consumer protection agency with a strong
focus on privacy. But putting privacy under the greater
umbrella of consumer protection would have the advantages of
386. David H. Flaherty, Governmental Surveillance and Bureaucratic
Accountability: Data Protection Agencies in Western Societies, 11 SCI., TECH.,
& HUM. VALUES 7, 7 (1986). The World Wide Web was invented in 1989. See A
Short History of the Web, CERN, https://perma.cc/HCW4-N6FA. Even before
the World Wide Web was invented, scholars noted the importance of a data
protection agency in the United States, calling it both “desirable and
essential.” Flaherty, supra, at 16.
387. Who We Are, INFO. COMM’RS OFF., https://perma.cc/N8GH-N2KR.
388. Tasks and Powers, FED. COMM’R FOR DATA PROT. & FREEDOM INFO.,
https://perma.cc/4ZCK-424W.
389. State of Surveillance Tunisia, PRIV. INTERN’L (Mar. 14, 2019), https://
perma.cc/677M-A9ZP.
390. Data Protection Commission (DPC), MINISTRY OF COMMC’NS, https://
perma.cc/DB85-6MMY.
391. About Us, PERS. INFO. PROT. COMM’N, https://perma.cc/G9UWNMHW.
392. Protecting and Promoting Privacy Rights, OFF. PRIV. COMMN’R CAN.,
https://perma.cc/Z9QJ-DZEU (last updated Oct. 8, 2020).
393. Missions and Duties, PDP, https://perma.cc/8P5V-U28M.
394. Agencia de Protección de Datos de los Habitantes, PRODHAB, https://
perma.cc/EWQ8-ZDV8.
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having a single regulator addressing consumer protection issues
in a unified manner.395 For example, the FTC currently handles
privacy and data security issues related to social media such as
adherence to privacy policies, access to nonpublic information,
and password requirements.396 It also regulates consumer
protection issues that arise from social media, such as truthful
advertising and disclosure of sponsorships.397
Proponents of the status quo argue that consumer
protection and competition should be considered together
because the two goals are closely interlinked.398 Certainly,
consumer protection and antitrust laws can sometimes be
mutually beneficial to each other. Consumer protection can
resolve information asymmetries that hurt competition. It can
also bolster consumer trust in markets by preventing deceptive
business practices.399 Antitrust laws may move us to better
privacy protections: companies can compete based on different
privacy protections.400 However, these small areas of overlap

395. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 320, at 585–90.
396. Julie Brill, Privacy & Consumer Protection in Social Media, 90 N.C.
L. REV. 1295, 1298–99 (2012).
397. See id. at 1305–07 (enumerating the disclosures required of social
media advertisers and endorsers under the amended FTC Enforcement
Guides).
398. See, e.g., Blumenthal, supra note 37, at 45 (explaining that if
separated, “the consideration of competition values in consumer protection
would be diluted, probably to the detriment of the public”).
399. See J. Howard Beales III & Timothy J. Muris, FTC Consumer
Protection at 100: 1970s Redux or Protecting Markets to Protect Consumers?,
83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2157, 2172 (2015) (“By striving to keep sellers honest,
consumer protection policy does more than safeguard the interests of the
individual victim—it serves the interest of consumers generally and facilitates
competition.”).
400. See Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 314, at 1143 (“Enforcing antitrust
law has given the FTC ongoing involvement in multiple high-tech
markets— as well as an understanding of how competition can motivate
companies to offer better privacy protections.”); Charles Duan et al.,
Comments on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century
Hearings Hearing #12: The FTC’s Approach to Consumer Privacy, R STREET
(May 31, 2019), https://perma.cc/Z9G7-KWWH (“First, privacy and
competition are inextricably linked. Increasing protections for one may result
in the limitation of the other. At the same time, some privacy protections can
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and positive effects do not imply an essential relationship
between consumer protection and antitrust. If the market
generally delivered the level of privacy that society deemed
necessary, we would not need the current laws to protect
privacy, nor would the Congress be considering introducing new
and strengthened laws on the subject. By retaining its general
consumer protection duties, the FTC would be well positioned to
address privacy issues.401
CONCLUSION
Dual antitrust enforcement by the DOJ and the FTC has
always created some problems of waste and uncertainty by
maintaining overlapping centers of interpretive authority.402
But technology has made these costs intolerable and added
others. Because there are so many difficult questions about how
to apply antitrust law to emerging technology, different
enforcement agencies confuse companies key to our economic
growth as these agencies try to figure out the correct way
forward. In the important case of standard-essential patents,
the confusion is already rampant, as the DOJ and FTC are
locked in fundamental conflict.403
Consolidated antitrust enforcement should be lodged in the
DOJ.404 Technology has made antitrust more relevant to
international affairs because technology companies can be so
important to national security.405 Antitrust enforcement can
harm national security by advantaging foreign companies over
domestic ones. The DOJ, not the FTC, should be trusted to
consider the foreign policy objectives of the United States,
because the department is under direct control of the president,
who has the most tools at his or her disposal to conduct

actually improve competition, such as by making companies’ data practices
more transparent.”).
401. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 320, at 585–90.
402. See supra Part I.B.1.
403. See supra Part I.A.3.
404. See supra Part II.
405. See supra Part II.A.
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international affairs and direct national security as a
constitutional right.406
Consolidating antitrust enforcement in the DOJ would also
free up the FTC to focus on privacy, another issue that is coming
to the fore because of the rising importance of digital
technology.407 The removal of antitrust responsibilities would
permit FTC employees and commissioners to focus on privacy
as one important aspect of consumer protection, already at the
core of the agency’s statutory mission. Consolidation of antitrust
within the DOJ would eliminate the FTC’s current mission of
promoting market competition which at times can be
inconsistent with promoting privacy, because privacy regulation
may require constraints on the market.
It is well understood that private companies must adapt to
rapid technological change if they are to be effective in their
markets. The structure of government needs to adapt no less.
The division of antitrust enforcement between the DOJ and FTC
is a paradigmatic example of a government structure whose
weaknesses have been exacerbated by technological change.
Consolidating antitrust enforcement within the DOJ will show
that the federal government can reshape itself to address
technological transformation. Its successful completion will
provide impetus for the needed structural change in other areas
of government so that the nation’s regulatory capacity can
match the dynamism of our world.

406.
407.

See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.B.

